|Opis:||In the doctoral dissertation, the debtor's objection to an enforcement order on the basis of an enforceable title is treated as a phenomenon of legal certainty; the legal construct is both material and procedural in nature, and its essential characteristic in our regulation is its exclusivity. This is also the starting point for determining the topic and field of research. The doctoral dissertation makes important conclusions which I outline in continuation.
Objection to an enforcement order must first be viewed as the debtor's right to be heard in the proceedings (Article 22 of the Constitution). The fact that it is also the debtor's legal remedy against an enforcement order is of secondary importance. Since in our system the objection is of an exclusive nature, the objection procedure must be managed in a way that enables the two parties to exercise their right to participate in the procedure. The logical consequence of exclusivity is the scope of relevant grounds for objection. In an objection, it is permissible to invoke all grounds for objection that make the enforcement inadmissible. If the court does not recognise that an objection is the debtor's only legal remedy, the debtor is deprived of the constitutional right to participate in the proceedings and, in particular, the right to legal protection. The second, separate question is whether it is optimal that the court decides on all grounds for objection in an enforcement procedure, or rather, how wide the scope of the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence in an enforcement procedure is. A system which would restrict the debtor with admissible grounds for objection and means of evidence would be unconstitutional if it did not offer other possibilities to the debtor, that is, possibilities outside of the ongoing enforcement procedure, to achieve effective protection of the debtor’s rights. It has been proven that our regulation on the objection procedure is the simplest. The debtor shall assert all objections to the enforcement with one legal remedy within the enforcement procedure. For the debtor, such course of action is not only the cheapest but also the most effective. In doing so, our regulation drastically deviates from the German or comparable Austrian regulation, both of which are demanding and complicated in this respect. At the same time, it deviates from the regulation of Croatia, with which we once shared the enforcement law.
In our regulation, procedural laws often change. The doctoral dissertation has shown that our regulation on objections does not require substantial changes; certainly not in the sense of fragmenting the objection to a number of legal remedies. The legislator should bear in mind that any radical changes to the procedural law require a radical response of the legal practice and legal theory, as well as time to reach a coordinated position, which is critical for ensuring equal protection of rights. The current regulation on objections resulted from the discovery of abuse of enforcement actions and from the difficulties that the case law had in deciding on objections under regulation prior to the ZIZ-A1 amendment.
The regulation on the objection procedure is not optimal. De lege ferenda, we should follow the reasons of the Constitutional Court and emphasise the importance of objection as a form of exercising the right to be heard in proceedings. In this context, consideration should be given to whether, at least for oppositional grounds for objection and grounds for objection for non-transfer of claims or obligations, we should limit the admissibility of evidence solely to documentary evidence and, even then, only to so-called qualified documents, with due regard to legal presumptions, generally known facts and general rules on the indisputability of contested facts. This would be particularly appropriate in the enforcement of monetary claims.|