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Naslov:Second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
Avtorji:Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Physical_Review_X_2017_Szolnoki,_Perc_Second-Order_Free-Riding_on_Antisocial_Punishment_Restores_the_Effectiveness_of_Prosocial_Punishme.pdf (1,15 MB)
MD5: ECCD47A78B49E1D96E96BC5D621A3459
 
URL https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevX.7.041027
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order free-riding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that noncooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here, we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does is viable, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order free-riding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.
Ključne besede:complex systems, interdisciplinary physics, punishment, cooperation
Leto izida:2017
Št. strani:str. 1-11
Številčenje:št. 4, Letn. 7
ISSN:2160-3308
UDK:53
COBISS_ID:23441160 Novo okno
DOI:10.1103/PhysRevX.7.041027 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:2160-3308
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:HCFNIDI0
Število ogledov:472
Število prenosov:296
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Physical Review X
Skrajšan naslov:Phys. Rev. X
Založnik:American Physical Society
ISSN:2160-3308
COBISS.SI-ID:19686152 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:J1-7009
Naslov:Fazni prehodi proti kooperaciji v sklopljenih populacijah

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:13.11.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:kompleksni sistemi, interdisciplinarna fizika, kaznovanje, sodelovanje


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