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Title:Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Authors:Helbing, Dirk (Author)
Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Szabó, György (Author)
Files:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2010_Helbing_et_al._Punish,_but_not_too_hard_how_costly_punishment_spreads_in_the_spatial_public_goods_game.pdf (823,76 KB)
MD5: 533591778CE44C835C937DCAC25C3C5A
 
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/12/i=8/a=083005?key=crossref.77dc5c47ba40519fa052a6b641ce4661
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work (r2)
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Keywords:evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Year of publishing:2010
Number of pages:str. 1-15
Numbering:Letn. 12
ISSN:1367-2630
UDC:53:33
ISSN on article:1367-2630
COBISS_ID:14377750 New window
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/12/8/083005 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:IRCRYSA7
Views:782
Downloads:305
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:New Journal of Physics
Publisher:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
ISSN:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:EC - European Commission
Funding Programme:FP7
Project no.:231200
Name:Quality Collectives: Socially Intelligent Systems for Quality
Acronym:QLectives

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:03.07.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:evolucijska teorija iger, družbena lastnina, prostorske igre, kazen, sociološki sistemi, morala


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