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Title:Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperation
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2008_Szolnoki,_Perc_Coevolution_of_teaching_activity_promotes_cooperation.pdf (521,01 KB)
MD5: AB40BA4E99837DDE77F6F12D2BE270AB
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/10/i=4/a=043036?key=crossref.74e8e12998fe6b3ca1d8423dcc0d749b
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.
Keywords:evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, snowdrift game, coevolution
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2008
Number of pages:str. 1-10
Numbering:Letn. 10
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66534 New window
ISSN on article:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:12216342 New window
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/10/4/043036 New window
Publication date in DKUM:30.06.2017
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:New Journal of Physics
Publisher:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:Z1-9629
Name:Stohastika in kaos kot učinkovita promotorja kooperacije in reda v fizikalnih sistemih in družbi


License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:30.06.2017

Secondary language

Keywords:evolucijska teorija iger, dilema zapornika, prostorske igre, igra sokola in orla, koevolucija


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