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Title:Podnebna kooperacija v igri zapornikove dileme
Authors:ID Murks Bašič, Aleksandra (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:URL http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-RS9AKNRT
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Not categorized
Typology:1.02 - Review Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Podnebne spremembe so obravnavane kot eden izmed največjih izzivov na ravni mednarodne kooperacije, s katerimi se sooča človeštvo. Podnebni problem je namreč klasičen problem, ki se ukvarja z javnimi dobrinami. Teorija iger je eno izmed orodij, s pomočjo katerih lahko definiramo glavne kriterije za izvedbo mednarodnih skupnih aktivnosti obvladovanja podnebnih sprememb. Takšne skupne aktivnosti bodo v članku uporabljene z namenom predstavitve evolucije uspešnega sodelovanja. Svet je spoznal, da obvladovanje podnebnih sprememb povzroča stroške, in nagnjenost k onesnaževanju bo vedno prisotna. Zato se vprašajmo, ali lahko stohastični element v podnebni igri, ki pomeni neko stopnjo negotovosti, zviša verjetnost prevzema strategije kooperacije. Naš model temelji na igri zapornikove dileme, ki proučuje evolucijo kot sodelovanje med sebičnimi posamezniki.
Keywords:javne dobrine, klimatske spremembe, teorija iger, kooperacija
Publisher:Društvo ekonomistov Maribor
Year of publishing:2011
Number of pages:str. 53-62
Numbering:Letn. 57, št. 5/6
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-52270 New window
UDC:551.588.7:330.123
ISSN on article:0547-3101
COBISS.SI-ID:68068609 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:QZMRL3QK
Publication date in DKUM:10.07.2015
Views:2315
Downloads:64
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
:
MURKS BAŠIČ, Aleksandra and PERC, Matjaž, 2011, Podnebna kooperacija v igri zapornikove dileme. Naše gospodarstvo : revija za aktualna gospodarska vprašanja [online]. 2011. Vol. 57, no. 5/6, p. 53–62. [Accessed 12 April 2025]. Retrieved from: http://www.dlib.si/details/URN:NBN:SI:DOC-RS9AKNRT
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Naše gospodarstvo : revija za aktualna gospodarska vprašanja
Shortened title:Naše gospod.
Publisher:Ekonomsko-poslovna fakulteta, Društvo ekonomistov Maribor, Ekonomski center Maribor
ISSN:0547-3101
COBISS.SI-ID:751364 New window

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Climate change cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Abstract:Climate change has been described as one of the greatest challenges to international cooperation that the world has faced thus far. Indeed, the climate problem is a classic problem of dealing with global goods. Game theory is one of the tools that can be used to identify key criteria for designing frameworks for international collective action on climate change. Such collective action is used in the current paper to present the evolution of cooperative behaviour. The world has realised that tackling the climate change will be costly; therefore, the temptation to pollute will always be present. Can the stochastic element in our climate game, which refers to some level of uncertainty, increase the probability of adopting the cooperation strategy? Our model is based on the prisonerʼs dilemma game, in which the evolution of cooperative behaviour among egoistic individuals is considered.


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