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Title:Evolucijska teorija iger kot spinski sistem
Authors:ID Murks Bašič, Aleksandra (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf DR_Murks_Basic_Aleksandra_2012.pdf (4,63 MB)
MD5: 1AB0C8C9F8F1EE84854C236516145967
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/dc761b9f-d2a6-4a7f-89e0-fe6d477c8536
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Dissertation
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Očitno je, da se naše podnebje spreminja in s tem ustvarja globalni problem, s katerim se moramo spopasti na mednarodni ravni. Podnebne spremembe so zato obravnavane kot primer največje socialne dileme, s katero se človeštvo sooča. Zakaj? Učinki podnebnih sprememb niso enakomerno razporejeni po celem svetu. Rezultat je klasičen problem, ki se ustvari kadar imamo opravka z javnimi dobrinami. Globalno-podnebni problem lahko uspešno rešimo samo na način, ki bo zagotovil mednarodno koordinacijo skupnih aktivnosti, kjer bodo sodelovale vse države sveta. Stroški posamezne države se lahko kaj hitro izračunajo, medtem ko bodo koristi porazdeljene med vse "igralce", neodvisno od njihovih dejanskih prispevkov k trajnostnemu razvoju. Evolucijska teorija iger je eno izmed najprimernejših teoretičnih orodij za preučevanje izzivov na področju podnebnih sprememb, s pomočjo katere bomo definirali glavne kriterije za evolucijo uspešnega sodelovanja. Svet je spoznal, da obvladovanje podnebnih sprememb povzroča stroške in zato bo nagnjenost k onesnaževanju vedno prisotna. Zato se vprašamo, ali lahko stohastični vplivi, kompleksne interakcijske mreže in koevolucija v podnebni igri zvišajo verjetnost prevzema čistejše strategije? Uporabljene so metode statistične fizike, Monte Carlo simulacije in igra zapornikove dileme z namenom podati nove odgovore na vprašanje kako rešiti naše podnebje in zaustaviti globalno segrevanje. Zapornikova dilema je še posebej primerna, saj proučuje evolucijo sodelovanja med sebičnimi posamezniki, kjer je kooperacija vprašljiva zaradi mamljivosti izbire strategije defekcije, hkrati pa lahko dilemo obravnavamo kot spinski sistem, in na ta način vpeljemo fizikalni pristop obravnave podnebnega problema.
Keywords:evolucijske igre, časovne serije, kompleksne mreže, algoritem vidljivosti, koevolucija, podnebne spremembe, zapornikova dilema, evolucija kooperacije, stohastičnost, tragedija javnih dobrin
Place of publishing:[Maribor
Publisher:A. Murks Bašič]
Year of publishing:2012
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-22034 New window
UDC:53
COBISS.SI-ID:260495360 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:WF1KXKX3
Publication date in DKUM:15.03.2012
Views:4864
Downloads:451
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:FNM
:
MURKS BAŠIČ, Aleksandra, 2012, Evolucijska teorija iger kot spinski sistem [online]. Doctoral dissertation. Maribor : A. Murks Bašič. [Accessed 23 April 2025]. Retrieved from: https://dk.um.si/IzpisGradiva.php?lang=eng&id=22034
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Secondary language

Language:English
Title:EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY AS A SPIN SYSTEM
Abstract:It is obvious that the climate change is underway, constituting a pressing global problem that needs to be dealt with at the global level. Tackling climate change means tackling the biggest social dilemma in the human history. Why? Because the adverse effects of climate change are not equally distributed across the world, the result being that this is a classical problem of dealing with global goods on a massive scale. Climate change mitigation can be successful only if the whole world will undertake an internationally coordinated collective action. Costs to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases can be easily calculated for each individual, but benefits of the successful reduction will be distributed among all the "players", independently of their actual contributions to sustainable development. Evolutionary game theory provides a suitable theoretical framework for studying the challenges of climate change, and we will reveal the main criteria for the successful evolution of cooperation. It has namely become painfully obvious that alleviating the negative consequences of the climate change will be costly, and accordingly, the temptations to pollute will always be present. Thus, we ask whether unpredictability, complex interaction networks and coevolution can increase the probability of adopting the cleaner strategy? We employ methods of statistical physics, Monte Carlo simulations and the spatial prisoner's dilemma game in order to provide new insights and answers that may help us to save our climate by stopping the adverse changes. The prisoner's dilemma game is particularly suited as it captures the essence of the problem when cooperative individuals are faced with temptations to resorting to the defective strategy, while at the same time the dilemma can be treated as a spin system, thus enabling a physics-inspired treatment of the climate problem.
Keywords:evolutionary games, time series, complex networks, visibility algorithm, coevolution, climate change, prisoner's dilemma, evolution of cooperation, stochasticity, tragedy of the commons


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