| | SLO | ENG | Cookies and privacy

Bigger font | Smaller font
First page > Show document

Show document Help

Title:Tožba zaradi nedelovanja Evropske komisije: diskrecijska pravica kot procesna ovira : diskrecijska pravica kot procesna ovira
Authors:ID Bele, Nika (Author)
ID Weingerl, Petra (Mentor) More about this mentor... New window
Files:.pdf MAG_Bele_Nika_2022.pdf (939,54 KB)
MD5: E0AB86EF3312887B3498874BF9309D1B
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/0f67b856-f021-4075-8bde-adb67ac7b252
 
Language:Slovenian
Work type:Master's thesis/paper
Typology:2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:PF - Faculty of Law
Abstract:Načelo pravne države skladno z 2. členom PEU predstavlja enega izmed temeljnih načel na katerih temelji Evropska unija. Kljub pomembnosti tega načela pa smo v zadnjih letih na evropskem političnem parketu priča njegovemu (načrtnemu) spodkopavanju s strani določenih držav članic EU. Čeprav kriza pravne države v prvi vrsti odpira vprašanje glede (spornih) ravnanj in ukrepov držav članic EU, pa moramo nanjo gledati tudi skozi prizmo odzivov evropskih institucij. Posebej relevanten in pomemben je na tem mestu odziv Evropske komisije, ki velja za »varuhinjo Pogodb« in ki skladno s 17. členom PEU skrbi za uporabo Pogodb in ukrepov, ki jih institucije sprejemajo na njuni podlagi. Kriza pravne države oz. vladavine prava tako odpira vprašanja glede možnosti sankcioniranja držav članic v primeru sistemskih in načrtnih dejanj in ukrepov, ki v praksi ogrožajo omenjeno načelo. Sodno varstvo je v EU zagotovljeno že na primarni ravni z določbo 47. člena Listine EU o temeljnih pravicah, ki določa pravico od učinkovitega pravnega sredstva in nepristranskega sodišča. Pravno oz. sodno varstvo je znotraj EU konkretizirano v večih postopkih, ki so večinoma urejeni v Pogodbah. Najpogostejši postopek za ugotavljanje kršitev držav članic je tožba zaradi neizpolnitve obveznosti iz Pogodb, ki jo predvideva 258. člen PDEU. Ker je spodkopavanje načela pravne države v praksi težko okategorizirati za kršitev določbe Pogodb je za kršitve tega načela na videz primernejši politični postopek iz 7. člena PEU, ki je v spošnem namenjen sankcioniranju sistemskih nevarnosti za načelo vladavine prava. Zaradi vprašljive uspešnosti takšnega postopka v praksi je EU sprejela dodatne mehanizme za zaščito načela pravne države. Sprva je bil leta 2014 izdelan »Novi okvir EU za krepitev načela pravne države«, leta 2020 pa je bila sprejeta Uredba 2020/2092 o splošnem režimu pogojenosti za zaščito proračuna Unije, ki ščiti proračun EU pred kršitvami načel pravne države. Z željo po krepitvi načela pravne države so z Novim okvirom in Uredbo 2020/2092 Evropski komisiji naložene dodatne pristojnosti v zvezi s samim pričetkom omenjenih postopkov. V oktobru 2021 je Evropski parlament vložil tožbo zaradi nedelovanja Evropske komisije, v kateri ji očita neukrepanje v zvezi s postopkom po Uredbi 2020/2092. Ta tožba tako odpira polemiko v zvezi z nedelovanjem institucij (konkretneje Komisije) v primeru, ko evropska zakonodaja predvideva možnost sankcioniranja DČ, a sama institucija takšne možnosti ne izkoristi. Vprašanje pasivnosti institucij je v praksi mnogokrat tesno povezano z vprašanjem obstoja diskrecijske pravice glede sprožitve posameznega postopka. V magistrski nalogi se tako konkretneje ukvarjam z institutom tožbe zaradi nedelovanja, ki jo ureja 265. člen PDEU. V ospredju obravnave instituta bo predstavljeno nedelovanje Evropske komisije, pri čemer bom skušala najti (morebitno) povezavo med diskrecijsko pravico ter dopustnostjo tožbe zaradi nedelovanja.
Keywords:učinkovito sodno varstvo, tožba zaradi nedelovanja, 265. člen PDEU, Evropska komisija, diskrecija, vladavina prava.
Place of publishing:Maribor
Place of performance:Maribor
Publisher:[N. Bele]
Year of publishing:2022
Number of pages:1 spletni vir (1 datoteka PDF (84 str.))
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-81766 New window
UDC:341.6.146(043.3)
COBISS.SI-ID:114244099 New window
Publication date in DKUM:07.07.2022
Views:1065
Downloads:207
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:PF
:
BELE, Nika, 2022, Tožba zaradi nedelovanja Evropske komisije: diskrecijska pravica kot procesna ovira : diskrecijska pravica kot procesna ovira [online]. Master’s thesis. Maribor : N. Bele. [Accessed 9 April 2025]. Retrieved from: https://dk.um.si/IzpisGradiva.php?lang=eng&id=81766
Copy citation
  
Average score:
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
(0 votes)
Your score:Voting is allowed only for logged in users.
Share:Bookmark and Share


Searching for similar works...Please wait....
Hover the mouse pointer over a document title to show the abstract or click on the title to get all document metadata.

Licences

License:CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:27.05.2022

Secondary language

Language:English
Title:Action for the European Commission's failure to act: discretion as a procedural barrier : magistrsko delo
Abstract:The rule of law principle, as enshrined in article 2 TEU, presents one of the basic fundamental principles upon which the European Union is founded on. In the last few years an intentional backsliding of the rule of law principle can be observed among certain Member States, despite increased emphasis on the importance of this principle. Although the rule of law crisis primary opens questions in regard of (disputable) Member States actions, one must also view this crisis through the prism of European institution's responses to those actions of the Member States. Especially important and one of the most relevant responses is the response from the European Commission, which is regarded as the »guardian of the Treaties« and which in accordance with Article 17 TEU ensures the application of the Treaties, and of measures adopted by the institutions pursuant to them. The rule of law crisis also opens questions regarding the options of sanctioning those Member States which adopt measures that systematically and intentionally threaten the rule of law principle. The judicial protection in the EU is guaranteed in the primary legislation, explicitly for example in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, which governs the right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial. Judicial protection within the EU is further concretised by multiple procedures, which are mostly enshrined in the Treaties. The infringement procedure, provided in Article 258 TFEU, is one of the most common procedures which deals with Member State's breaches of their obligations originating from the Treaties. Because the undermining of the rule of law principle is hard to categorise as a breach of Treaties itself, Article 7 TEU provides for the political procedure, which is in essence intended for sanctioning clear risks and serious as well as persistent breaches of the rule of law principle. Due to the questionable effectiveness of such procedure in practise, the EU provides for additional mechanisms for the protection of rule of law principle. Firstly in 2014, the European Commission issued »A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law«, which was followed by the Regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget in 2020. These two documents confer upon the European Commission authority in regard with initiating those procedures. The European Parliament brought an action for failure to act against the European Commission in October 2021 in which the European Parliament blames the Commission for not initiating a procedure provided in Regulation 2020/2092. Thus, this action opens controversy of European institutions' (concretely Commission's) inactions in those cases where European legislation provides for possible sanctions for Member States, but an institution itself does not seize the possibility. The question of institution's inaction is frequently related to discretionary power to commence procedure. In this thesis, I will therefore focus on the institute of action for failure to act, enshrined in Article 265 TFEU, with emphasis on the European Commission’s inaction. Furthermore, I will try to establish a (potential) link between discretion and admissibility of the action for failure to act.
Keywords:effective legal system, Action for failure to act, Article 265 TFEU, European Commission, discretion, rule of law.


Comments

Leave comment

You must log in to leave a comment.

Comments (0)
0 - 0 / 0
 
There are no comments!

Back
Logos of partners University of Maribor University of Ljubljana University of Primorska University of Nova Gorica