Večvrstna realizacija v luči sodobnih nevroznanstvenih raziskav

Todorović, Tadej

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Title:	Večvrstna realizacija v luči sodobnih nevroznanstvenih raziskav
Authors:	ID Todorović, Tadej (Author) ID Bregant, Janez (Mentor) More about this mentor...
Files:	MAG_Todorovic_Tadej_2017.pdf (1,14 MB) MD5: 31AAC7D55B8DC2CF86D68231B0B3A4EE PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/8b9b3af6-3a11-42f1-b722-8d508d03a971
Language:	Slovenian
Work type:	Master's thesis/paper
Typology:	2.09 - Master's Thesis
Organization:	FF - Faculty of Arts
Abstract:	Naloga se ukvarja s problemom večvrstne realizacije v filozofiji duha in telesa. V prvem delu naloge je predstavljen sam problem duha in telesa, kot ga poznamo v filozofiji, preko katerega je nato definirana in kontekstualizirana teza večvrstne realizacije – teza, ki zavrača psihofizični redukcionizem. V drugem delu naloge so predstavljeni možni ugovori večvrstni realizaciji, razdeljeni v tri skupine: ugovori zanikanja različnosti fizičnih stanj organizmov, ugovori zanikanja istosti mentalnih stanj organizmov ter kombiniran ugovor finega in grobega sita. Izpostavljene so dobre in slabe strani vseh ugovorov, prav tako je za vsak ugovor ponujena možna obramba večvrstne realizacije. V zadnjem delu naloge sta predstavljena dva potencialna empirična dokaza za večvrstno realizacijo, za katera se izkaže, da nista pristna primera večvrstne realizacije. To vodi v sklep, da večvrstna realizacija do sedaj še ni bila dokazana in kaže na to, da bo v luči ugovora finega in grobega sita zelo težko najti pristen primer večvrstne realizacije. Sledi alternativa za nasprotnike psihofizičnega redukcionizma v obliki principa ponovne uporabe nevronskih mrež, ki implicira možnost obstoja tako imenovane obrnjene večvrstne realizacije, ki, če je resnična, prav tako zavrača psihofizični redukcionizem. Naloga zaključi, da princip ponovne uporabe nevronskih mrež sicer ni a priori argument za obstoj obrnjene večvrstne realizacije, ampak sugerira, da je iskanje obstoja obrnjene večvrstne realizacije, v nasprotju z večvrstno realizacijo, morda boljša pot v iskanju dokaza proti psihofizičnemu redukcionizmu.
Keywords:	problem duha in telesa, večvrstna realizacija, redukcionizem, funkcionalizem, nevroznanost
Place of publishing:	Maribor
Publisher:	[T. Todorović]
Year of publishing:	2017
PID:	20.500.12556/DKUM-68293
UDC:	13(043.2)
COBISS.SI-ID:	23378952
NUK URN:	URN:SI:UM:DK:LGGYMGSZ
Publication date in DKUM:	06.10.2017
Views:	1485
Downloads:	207
Metadata:
Categories:	FF
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Licences

License:	CC BY-NC-ND 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Link:	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description:	The most restrictive Creative Commons license. This only allows people to download and share the work for no commercial gain and for no other purposes.
Licensing start date:	15.09.2017

Secondary language

Language:	English
Title:	Multiple Realizability in the Light of Recent Neuroscientific Research
Abstract:	The thesis deals with the multiple realizability problem in the philosophy of mind. In the first part, the mind–body problem, as known in philosophy, is presented and used as a basis for introducing the definition and contextualization of the multiple realizability thesis – the thesis that denies psychophysical reductionism. In the second part, the possible counter-arguments to the multiple realizability thesis are presented and divided into three groups: arguments denying the difference of physical states of organisms, arguments denying the sameness of mental states of organisms, and the combined argument against the multiple realizability thesis, the coarse and fine grain argument. The pros and cons of all arguments are presented, and for each argument, a possible defence of the multiple realizability thesis is provided. In the last part, two examples of potential empirical evidence are presented, but they are later recognized as ungenuine examples of multiple realizability. This leads to the conclusion that multiple realizability has not, until now, been proven, and that it will be incredibly hard to find a genuine example of multiple realizability that would withstand the coarse and fine grain argument. However, an alternative for the opponents of psychophysical reductionism is presented – the principle of neural reuse, which implies the possibility of the existence of the so-called inverse multiple realizability, which, if true, also refutes psychophysical reductionism. The thesis concludes that neural reuse is not an a priori argument for the existence of inverse multiple realizability; rather, it suggests that the search for the existence of inverse multiple realizability is, contrary to multiple realizability, perhaps a better way of finding the proof against psychophysical reductionism.
Keywords:	mind–body problem, multiple realizability, reductionism, functionalism, neuroscience

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