| Naslov: | Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies |
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| Avtorji: | ID Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor) |
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| Datoteke: |  Physical_Review_X_2013_Szolnoki,_Perc_Correlation_of_Positive_and_Negative_Reciprocity_Fails_to_Confer_an_Evolutionary_Advantage_Phase_T.pdf (667,46 KB)
MD5: 4C457F0C6FEA8C47ED32893C3EE2726B
PID: 20.500.12556/dkum/6c3f1894-542e-44bb-a3d4-424fe13acc16
 https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021
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| Jezik: | Angleški jezik |
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| Vrsta gradiva: | Članek v reviji |
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| Tipologija: | 1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek |
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| Organizacija: | FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
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| Opis: | Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments. |
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| Ključne besede: | public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems |
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| Status publikacije: | Objavljeno |
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| Verzija publikacije: | Objavljena publikacija |
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| Leto izida: | 2013 |
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| Št. strani: | str. 1-11 |
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| Številčenje: | Letn. 3, št. 4 |
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| PID: | 20.500.12556/DKUM-67132  |
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| ISSN: | 2160-3308 |
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| UDK: | 53 |
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| COBISS.SI-ID: | 20216584 |
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| DOI: | 10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 |
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| ISSN pri članku: | 2160-3308 |
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| NUK URN: | URN:SI:UM:DK:PUXWECXJ |
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| Datum objave v DKUM: | 03.08.2017 |
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| Število ogledov: | 1276 |
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| Število prenosov: | 371 |
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| Metapodatki: |    |
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| Področja: | Ostalo
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