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Title:Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf Physical_Review_X_2013_Szolnoki,_Perc_Correlation_of_Positive_and_Negative_Reciprocity_Fails_to_Confer_an_Evolutionary_Advantage_Phase_T.pdf (667,46 KB)
MD5: 4C457F0C6FEA8C47ED32893C3EE2726B
 
URL https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work (r2)
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Keywords:public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Year of publishing:2013
Publication status in journal:Published
Article version:Publisher's version of article
Number of pages:str. 1-11
Numbering:št. 4, Letn. 3
ISSN:2160-3308
UDC:53
ISSN on article:2160-3308
COBISS.SI-ID:20216584 New window
DOI:10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:PUXWECXJ
Publication date in DKUM:03.08.2017
Views:662
Downloads:289
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Physical Review X
Shortened title:Phys. Rev. X
Publisher:American Physical Society
ISSN:2160-3308
COBISS.SI-ID:19686152 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
izpis_stevilka_projekta:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:03.08.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:javne dobrine, kazen, nagrada, evolucijske igre, kolektivni pojav, fazni prehodi, fizika socioloških sistemov


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