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Naslov:Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Avtorji:Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Physical_Review_X_2013_Szolnoki,_Perc_Correlation_of_Positive_and_Negative_Reciprocity_Fails_to_Confer_an_Evolutionary_Advantage_Phase_T.pdf (667,46 KB)
MD5: 4C457F0C6FEA8C47ED32893C3EE2726B
 
URL https://journals.aps.org/prx/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Ključne besede:public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Leto izida:2013
Št. strani:str. 1-11
Številčenje:št. 4, Letn. 3
ISSN:2160-3308
UDK:53
COBISS_ID:20216584 Novo okno
DOI:10.1103/PhysRevX.3.041021 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:2160-3308
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:PUXWECXJ
Število ogledov:513
Število prenosov:265
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Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Physical Review X
Skrajšan naslov:Phys. Rev. X
Založnik:American Physical Society
ISSN:2160-3308
COBISS.SI-ID:19686152 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:J1-4055
Naslov:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:03.08.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:javne dobrine, kazen, nagrada, evolucijske igre, kolektivni pojav, fazni prehodi, fizika socioloških sistemov


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