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Naslov:Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
Avtorji:Chen, Xiaojie (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Frontiers_in_Behavioral_Neuroscience_2014_Chen,_Perc_Optimal_distribution_of_incentives_for_public_cooperation_in_heterogeneous_interact.pdf (3,26 MB)
MD5: EFA429BB312F842336822894C258BD40
 
URL http://journal.frontiersin.org/article/10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248/full
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.
Ključne besede:public cooperation, institutional reciprocity, scale-free network, punishment, reward
Leto izida:2014
Št. strani:str. 1-11
Številčenje:Letn. 8
ISSN:1662-5153
UDK:53
COBISS_ID:20810760 Novo okno
DOI:10.3389/fnbeh.2014.00248 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1662-5153
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:BBBIPIRO
Število ogledov:666
Število prenosov:329
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience
Skrajšan naslov:Front. Behav. Neurosci.
Založnik:Frontiers Research Foundation
ISSN:1662-5153
COBISS.SI-ID:20809480 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:J1-4055
Naslov:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:10.07.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:javna kooperacija, institucionalna recipročnost, scale-free mreža, kazen, nagrada


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