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Izpis gradiva

Naslov:Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Avtorji:Helbing, Dirk (Avtor)
Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Szabó, György (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2010_Helbing_et_al._Punish,_but_not_too_hard_how_costly_punishment_spreads_in_the_spatial_public_goods_game.pdf (823,76 KB)
MD5: 533591778CE44C835C937DCAC25C3C5A
 
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/12/i=8/a=083005?key=crossref.77dc5c47ba40519fa052a6b641ce4661
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Ključne besede:evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Leto izida:2010
Št. strani:str. 1-15
Številčenje:Letn. 12
ISSN:1367-2630
UDK:53:33
COBISS_ID:14377750 Novo okno
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/12/8/083005 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1367-2630
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:IRCRYSA7
Število ogledov:790
Število prenosov:305
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:New Journal of Physics
Založnik:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
ISSN:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:EC - European Commission
Program financ.:FP7
Številka projekta:231200
Naslov:Quality Collectives: Socially Intelligent Systems for Quality
Akronim:QLectives

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:03.07.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:evolucijska teorija iger, družbena lastnina, prostorske igre, kazen, sociološki sistemi, morala


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