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Title:Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networks
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2009_Szolnoki,_Perc_Emergence_of_multilevel_selection_in_the_prisoner_s_dilemma_game_on_coevolving_random_network.pdf (627,32 KB)
MD5: 59BEB5E3B65B7A5B89AB727A8745F632
 
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/11/i=9/a=093033?key=crossref.f0cb6704b6fa8995148a94079b1461d2
 
Language:English
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Keywords:evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2009
Number of pages:str. 1-12
Numbering:Letn. 11
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66541 New window
ISSN:1367-2630
UDC:519.83:536.94
ISSN on article:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:13685014 New window
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/11/9/093033 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:EKC8ESFX
Publication date in DKUM:30.06.2017
Views:1646
Downloads:411
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:New journal of physics
Publisher:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
ISSN:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:Z1-2032
Name:Fizika konfliktov in njihova razrešitev

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:30.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:evolucijska teorija iger, dilema zapornika, prostorske igre, koevolucija, sociološki sistemi


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