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Title:Costly hide and seek pays : unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf New_Journal_of_Physics_2014_Szolnoki,_Perc_Costly_hide_and_seek_pays_unexpected_consequences_of_deceit_in_a_social_dilemma.pdf (580,42 KB)
MD5: AEEFF6F1207C77F3B4688C63AB1D087F
 
URL http://stacks.iop.org/1367-2630/16/i=11/a=113003?key=crossref.3c637fead0123ee37dc7b048abf5cdb3
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.
Keywords:social dynamics, deceit, evolutionary games, public goods, econophysics, cooperation
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2014
Number of pages:str. 1-16
Numbering:Letn. 16
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66537 New window
ISSN:1367-2630
UDC:53
ISSN on article:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:20914440 New window
DOI:10.1088/1367-2630/16/11/113003 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:NJEERQEA
Publication date in DKUM:30.06.2017
Views:1038
Downloads:171
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:New Journal of Physics
Publisher:Institute of Physics Publishing, Deutsche Physikalische Gesellschaft
ISSN:1367-2630
COBISS.SI-ID:21135621 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1–4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:30.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:socialna dinamika, zavajanje, evolucijske igre, javne dobrine, ekonofizika, sodelovanje


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