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Naslov:Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
Avtorji:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2016_Szolnoki,_Perc_Leaders_should_not_be_conformists_in_evolutionary_social_dilemmas.pdf (620,37 KB)
MD5: E1CBA6AFD51E9968D81780B9C2F78F4C
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep23633
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede:cooperation, public goods, selection, physics of social systems
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Leto izida:2016
Št. strani:str. 1-8
Številčenje:Letn. 6
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66403 Novo okno
ISSN:2045-2322
UDK:53
COBISS.SI-ID:22051080 Novo okno
DOI:10.1038/srep23633 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:2045-2322
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:7QUTRST3
Datum objave v DKUM:23.06.2017
Število ogledov:809
Število prenosov:388
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Scientific reports
Skrajšan naslov:Sci. rep.
Založnik:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:J1-7009
Naslov:Fazni prehodi proti kooperaciji v sklopljenih populacijah

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:23.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:sodelovanje, javne dobrine, selekcija, fizika socioloških sistemov


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