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Title:Leaders should not be conformists in evolutionary social dilemmas
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2016_Szolnoki,_Perc_Leaders_should_not_be_conformists_in_evolutionary_social_dilemmas.pdf (620,37 KB)
MD5: E1CBA6AFD51E9968D81780B9C2F78F4C
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep23633
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:The most common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that players should adopt a strategy that warrants the highest payoff. However, recent studies indicate that the spatial selection for cooperation is enhanced if an appropriate fraction of the population chooses the most common rather than the most profitable strategy within the interaction range. Such conformity might be due to herding instincts or crowd behavior in humans and social animals. In a heterogeneous population where individuals differ in their degree, collective influence, or other traits, an unanswered question remains who should conform. Selecting conformists randomly is the simplest choice, but it is neither a realistic nor the optimal one. We show that, regardless of the source of heterogeneity and game parametrization, socially the most favorable outcomes emerge if the masses conform. On the other hand, forcing leaders to conform significantly hinders the constructive interplay between heterogeneity and coordination, leading to evolutionary outcomes that are worse still than if conformists were chosen randomly. We conclude that leaders must be able to create a following for network reciprocity to be optimally augmented by conformity. In the opposite case, when leaders are castrated and made to follow, the failure of coordination impairs the evolution of cooperation.
Keywords:cooperation, public goods, selection, physics of social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2016
Number of pages:str. 1-8
Numbering:Letn. 6
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66403 New window
ISSN:2045-2322
UDC:53
ISSN on article:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:22051080 New window
DOI:10.1038/srep23633 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:7QUTRST3
Publication date in DKUM:23.06.2017
Views:824
Downloads:391
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Scientific reports
Shortened title:Sci. rep.
Publisher:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-7009
Name:Fazni prehodi proti kooperaciji v sklopljenih populacijah

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:23.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:sodelovanje, javne dobrine, selekcija, fizika socioloških sistemov


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