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Title:Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
Authors:ID Chen, Xiaojie (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2014_Chen,_Perc_Excessive_abundance_of_common_resources_deters_social_responsibility.pdf (950,12 KB)
MD5: 3E85E29BBFC6755FC2A8B509D961D682
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep04161
 
Language:English
Work type:Article
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
Keywords:social dilemma, evolutionary games, public goods, abundance, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2014
Number of pages:str. 1-5
Numbering:Letn. 4
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66397 New window
ISSN:2045-2322
UDC:53
ISSN on article:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:20361736 New window
DOI:10.1038/srep04161 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:VRKCLPOY
Publication date in DKUM:23.06.2017
Views:1968
Downloads:407
Metadata:XML DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Scientific reports
Shortened title:Sci. rep.
Publisher:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:23.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:socialna dilema, evolucijske igre, javne dobrine, izobilje, fazni prehodi, fizika socioloških sistemov


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