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Title:Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
Authors:ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2014_Szolnoki,_Perc_Defection_and_extortion_as_unexpected_catalysts_of_unconditional_cooperation_in_structured_popula.pdf (995,18 KB)
MD5: 58550FBC0D81FDF2073CDEF9E4B047BE
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep05496
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner%s dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
Keywords:social dilemma, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2014
Number of pages:str. 1-6
Numbering:Letn. 4
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66393 New window
ISSN:2045-2322
UDC:53
ISSN on article:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:20696072 New window
DOI:10.1038/srep05496 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:ZKPJZ0RD
Publication date in DKUM:23.06.2017
Views:1021
Downloads:375
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Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Scientific reports
Shortened title:Sci. rep.
Publisher:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:23.06.2017

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:socialna dilema, evolucijske igre, kolektivni pojav, fazni prehodi, fizika socioloških sistemov


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