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Title:Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Authors:Liu, Yongkui (Author)
Chen, Xiaojie (Author)
Zhang, Lin (Author)
Wang, Long (Author)
Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2012_Liu_et_al._Win-Stay-Lose-Learn_Promotes_Cooperation_in_the_Spatial_Prisoner_s_Dilemma_Game.PDF (390,56 KB)
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030689
Work type:Scientific work (r2)
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed winstay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related winstay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner's dilemma.
Keywords:social dilemmas, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, networks
Year of publishing:2012
Number of pages:str. 1-8
Numbering:št. 2, Letn. 7
ISSN on article:1932-6203
COBISS_ID:18986504 Link is opened in a new window
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689 Link is opened in a new window
License:CC BY 4.0
This work is available under this license: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:PloS ONE
Publisher:Public Library of Science
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Project no.:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Secondary language

Keywords:socialne dileme, dilema zapornika, kooperacija, mreže


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