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Title:Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Authors:ID Liu, Yongkui (Author)
ID Chen, Xiaojie (Author)
ID Zhang, Lin (Author)
ID Wang, Long (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
Files:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2012_Liu_et_al._Win-Stay-Lose-Learn_Promotes_Cooperation_in_the_Spatial_Prisoner_s_Dilemma_Game.PDF (390,56 KB)
MD5: B2358C3A822BA507BFE5142E578079FE
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030689
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed winstay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related winstay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner's dilemma.
Keywords:social dilemmas, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, networks
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2012
Number of pages:str. 1-8
Numbering:Letn. 7, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66308 New window
ISSN on article:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:18986504 New window
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689 New window
Publication date in DKUM:19.06.2017
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:PloS one
Publisher:Public Library of Science
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov


License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:19.06.2017

Secondary language

Keywords:socialne dileme, dilema zapornika, kooperacija, mreže


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