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Naslov:Win-stay-lose-learn promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game
Avtorji:ID Liu, Yongkui (Avtor)
ID Chen, Xiaojie (Avtor)
ID Zhang, Lin (Avtor)
ID Wang, Long (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2012_Liu_et_al._Win-Stay-Lose-Learn_Promotes_Cooperation_in_the_Spatial_Prisoner_s_Dilemma_Game.PDF (390,56 KB)
MD5: B2358C3A822BA507BFE5142E578079FE
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0030689
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Članek v reviji
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Holding on to one's strategy is natural and common if the later warrants success and satisfaction. This goes against widespread simulation practices of evolutionary games, where players frequently consider changing their strategy even though their payoffs may be marginally different than those of the other players. Inspired by this observation, we introduce an aspiration-based win-stay-lose-learn strategy updating rule into the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. The rule is simple and intuitive, foreseeing strategy changes only by dissatisfied players, who then attempt to adopt the strategy of one of their nearest neighbors, while the strategies of satisfied players are not subject to change. We find that the proposed winstay-lose-learn rule promotes the evolution of cooperation, and it does so very robustly and independently of the initial conditions. In fact, we show that even a minute initial fraction of cooperators may be sufficient to eventually secure a highly cooperative final state. In addition to extensive simulation results that support our conclusions, we also present results obtained by means of the pair approximation of the studied game. Our findings continue the success story of related winstay strategy updating rules, and by doing so reveal new ways of resolving the prisoner's dilemma.
Ključne besede:social dilemmas, prisoner's dilemma, cooperation, networks
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Leto izida:2012
Št. strani:str. 1-8
Številčenje:Letn. 7, št. 2
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66308 Novo okno
ISSN:1932-6203
UDK:530.16
COBISS.SI-ID:18986504 Novo okno
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0030689 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1932-6203
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:VT6VG2PO
Datum objave v DKUM:19.06.2017
Število ogledov:1249
Število prenosov:357
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PloS one
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:J1-4055
Naslov:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:19.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:socialne dileme, dilema zapornika, kooperacija, mreže


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