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Naslov:Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent collective behavior
Avtorji:ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
ID Donnay, Karsten (Avtor)
ID Helbing, Dirk (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2013_Perc,_Donnay,_Helbing_Understanding_Recurrent_Crime_as_System-Immanent_Collective_Behavior.PDF (433,51 KB)
MD5: 6B8CF58296CA6B33357913B39AA62F4F
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0076063
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Containing the spreading of crime is a major challenge for society. Yet, since thousands of years, no effective strategy has been found to overcome crime. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that crime is recurrent, a fact that is not captured well by rational choice theories of crime. According to these, strong enough punishment should prevent crime from happening. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between crime and punishment, we consider that the latter requires prior discovery of illicit behavior and study a spatial version of the inspection game. Simulations reveal the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between criminals, inspectors, and ordinary people as a consequence of spatial interactions. Such cycles dominate the evolutionary process, in particular when the temptation to commit crime or the cost of inspection are low or moderate. Yet, there are also critical parameter values beyond which cycles cease to exist and the population is dominated either by a stable mixture of criminals and inspectors or one of these two strategies alone. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions to different final states are possible, indicating that successful strategies to contain crime can be very much counter-intuitive and complex. Our results demonstrate that spatial interactions are crucial for the evolutionary outcome of the inspection game, and they also reveal why criminal behavior is likely to be recurrent rather than evolving towards an equilibrium with monotonous parameter dependencies.
Ključne besede:crime, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, statistical physics
Leto izida:2013
Status objave pri reviji:Objavljeno
Verzija članka:Založnikova različica članka
Št. strani:str. 1-7
Številčenje:št. 10, Letn. 8
ISSN:1932-6203
UDK:53
COBISS.SI-ID:20143880 Novo okno
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0076063 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1932-6203
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:SXSPI9PT
Datum objave v DKUM:19.06.2017
Število ogledov:940
Število prenosov:401
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PloS one
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:EC - European Commission
Program financ.:FP7
Številka projekta:231200
Naslov:Quality Collectives: Socially Intelligent Systems for Quality
Akronim:QLectives

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:19.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:zločin, evolucijske igre, kolektivni pojav, fazni prehodi, statistična fizika


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