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Naslov:If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Avtorji:Jiang, Luo-Luo (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2013_Jiang,_Perc,_Szolnoki_If_Cooperation_Is_Likely_Punish_Mildly_Insights_from_Economic_Experiments_Based_on_the_Snowdrift_Gam.PDF (522,94 KB)
MD5: 924C43F7975ED55696ADDDB3759F80DC
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0064677
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Ključne besede:public goods, punishment, economic experiments, snowdrift game
Leto izida:2013
Št. strani:str. 1-7
Številčenje:št. 5, Letn. 8
ISSN:1932-6203
UDK:53
COBISS_ID:19889928 Novo okno
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0064677 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1932-6203
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:EIVHJPIO
Število ogledov:606
Število prenosov:305
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PloS one
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:J1-4055
Naslov:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:19.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:javne dobrine, kazen, ekonomski eksperimenti, igra sneženega plazu


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