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Naslov:Heterogeneous aspirations promote cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game
Avtorji:Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Wang, Zhen (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2010_Perc,_Wang_Heterogeneous_Aspirations_Promote_Cooperation_in_the_Prisoner_s_Dilemma_Game.PDF (822,95 KB)
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0015117
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hopeof successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player uniformly at random. Here we introduce a parameter that interpolates between these two extreme options. Setting equal to zero returns the random selection of the opponent, while positive favor the fitter players. In addition, we divide the population intotwo groups. Players from group select their opponents as dictated by the parameter , while players from group do so randomly irrespective of . We denote the fraction of players contained in groups and by and , respectively. The two parameters and allow us to analyze in detail how aspirations in the context of the prisoner's dilemma game influence the evolution of cooperation. We find that for sufficiently positive values of there exist a robust intermediate for which cooperation thrives best. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction networks. We also provide complete phase diagrams depicting the dependence of the impact of and for different values of , and contrast the validity of ourconclusions by means of an alternative model where individual aspiration levels are subject to evolution as well. Our study indicates that heterogeneity in aspirations may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.
Ključne besede:evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, aspirations, social systems, physics and society
Leto izida:2010
Št. strani:str. 1-8
Številčenje:št. 12, Letn. 5
ISSN:1932-6203
UDK:530.16
COBISS_ID:14724886 Povezava se odpre v novem oknu
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0015117 Povezava se odpre v novem oknu
ISSN pri članku:1932-6203
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:OOBIHUOX
Licenca:CC BY 4.0
To delo je dosegljivo pod licenco Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Število ogledov:426
Število prenosov:157
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Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PloS ONE
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:Z1-2032
Naslov:Fizika konfliktov in njihova razrešitev

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:evolucijska teorija iger, dilema zapornika, prostorske igre, zgledovanje, sociološki sistemi, fizika socioloških sistemov


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