| | SLO | ENG | Piškotki in zasebnost

Večja pisava | Manjša pisava

Izpis gradiva Pomoč

Naslov:Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
Avtorji:ID Zhang, Chunyan (Avtor)
ID Zhang, Jianlei (Avtor)
ID Weissing, Franz (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
ID Xie, Guangming (Avtor)
ID Wang, Long (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2012_Zhang_et_al._Different_Reactions_to_Adverse_Neighborhoods_in_Games_of_Cooperation.PDF (481,90 KB)
MD5: 067D522D25A16AF6078108E43DBF0E4F
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035183
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede:cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Leto izida:2012
Št. strani:str. 1-7
Številčenje:Letn. 7, št. 4
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66270 Novo okno
ISSN:1932-6203
UDK:530.16
COBISS.SI-ID:19117064 Novo okno
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1932-6203
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:XQOGCGUM
Datum objave v DKUM:19.06.2017
Število ogledov:1251
Število prenosov:377
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
:
Kopiraj citat
  
Skupna ocena:(0 glasov)
Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
Objavi na:Bookmark and Share


Postavite miškin kazalec na naslov za izpis povzetka. Klik na naslov izpiše podrobnosti ali sproži prenos.

Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PloS one
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:J1-4055
Naslov:Fizika evolucijskih procesov

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:19.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:kooperacija, javne dobrine, fazni prehodi, socialne dileme, koevolucija, fizika socialnih sistemov


Komentarji

Dodaj komentar

Za komentiranje se morate prijaviti.

Komentarji (0)
0 - 0 / 0
 
Ni komentarjev!

Nazaj
Logotipi partnerjev Univerza v Mariboru Univerza v Ljubljani Univerza na Primorskem Univerza v Novi Gorici