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Title:Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
Authors:ID Zhang, Chunyan (Author)
ID Zhang, Jianlei (Author)
ID Weissing, Franz (Author)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
ID Xie, Guangming (Author)
ID Wang, Long (Author)
Files:.pdf PLoS_ONE_2012_Zhang_et_al._Different_Reactions_to_Adverse_Neighborhoods_in_Games_of_Cooperation.PDF (481,90 KB)
MD5: 067D522D25A16AF6078108E43DBF0E4F
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0035183
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Keywords:cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2012
Number of pages:str. 1-7
Numbering:Letn. 7, št. 4
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66270 New window
ISSN on article:1932-6203
COBISS.SI-ID:19117064 New window
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0035183 New window
Publication date in DKUM:19.06.2017
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:PloS one
Publisher:Public Library of Science
COBISS.SI-ID:2005896 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:J1-4055
Name:Fizika evolucijskih procesov


License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:19.06.2017

Secondary language

Keywords:kooperacija, javne dobrine, fazni prehodi, socialne dileme, koevolucija, fizika socialnih sistemov


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