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Naslov:Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
Avtorji:ID Helbing, Dirk (Avtor)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
ID Szabó, György (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf PLoS_Computational_Biology_2010_Helbing_et_al._Evolutionary_Establishment_of_Moral_and_Double_Moral_Standards_through_Spatial_Interactio.PDF (949,75 KB)
MD5: 70CC987BDDC3D4E7F093BB45F59A30BE
 
URL http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ('defectors'), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called 'cooperators' or 'second-order free-riders'), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ('moralists'), and defectors, who punish otherdefectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ('immoralists'). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the 'second-order free-rider problem'. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ('who laughs last laughs best effect'). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an 'unholy collaboration'. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of 'moral behavior' by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Ključne besede:evolutionary game theory, social dilemmas, spatial games, moral, cooperation
Leto izida:2010
Status objave pri reviji:Objavljeno
Verzija članka:Založnikova različica članka
Št. strani:str. 1-9
Številčenje:Letn. 6, št. 4
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-66248 Novo okno
ISSN:1553-734X
UDK:519.2:33
COBISS.SI-ID:14075158 Novo okno
DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000758 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:1553-734X
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:HNMAIPNC
Datum objave v DKUM:16.06.2017
Število ogledov:893
Število prenosov:373
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:PLoS Computational Biology
Skrajšan naslov:PLoS Comput. Biol.
Založnik:Public Library of Science
ISSN:1553-734X
COBISS.SI-ID:512883993 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:Z1-2032
Naslov:Fizika konfliktov in njihova razrešitev

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:16.06.2017

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:evolucijska teorija iger, socialne dileme, prostorske igre, morala, kooperacija


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