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Izpis gradiva

Naslov:Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
Avtorji:Chen, Xiaojie (Avtor)
Sasaki, Tatsuya (Avtor)
Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Chen,_Sasaki,_Perc_Evolution_of_public_cooperation_in_a_monitored_society_with_implicated_punishment_and_within-.pdf (1,50 MB)
MD5: 51824A75AA882431D86258D833BA509C
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep17050
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo (r2)
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
Ključne besede:cooperation, public goods, punishment, sustainable development, physics of social systems
Leto izida:2015
Št. strani:str. 1-12
Številčenje:Letn. 5
ISSN:2045-2322
UDK:53
COBISS_ID:21772552 Novo okno
DOI:10.1038/srep17050 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:2045-2322
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:CQHSHZ5C
Število ogledov:611
Število prenosov:315
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Scientific Reports
Založnik:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije (ARRS)
Številka projekta:P5-0027
Naslov:Prilagajanje slovenskega gospodarstva in razvojna identiteta Slovenije v EU

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:09.06.2016

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:kooperacija, javne dobrine, kazen, vzdržen razvoj, fizika socioloških sistemov


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