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Title:A double-edged sword: benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
Authors:ID Perc, Matjaž (Author)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Author)
Files:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Perc,_Szolnoki_A_double-edged_sword_Benefits_and_pitfalls_of_heterogeneous_punishment_in_evolutionary_inspection.pdf (1,62 MB)
MD5: 33E4AAB424674122A3A3EAB2A1AD5C81
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep11027
 
Language:English
Work type:Scientific work
Typology:1.01 - Original Scientific Article
Organization:FNM - Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics
Abstract:As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.
Keywords:crime, phase transition, social dilemma, physics of social systems
Publication status:Published
Publication version:Version of Record
Year of publishing:2015
Number of pages:str. 1-11
Numbering:Letn. 5
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-60185 New window
ISSN:2045-2322
UDC:53
ISSN on article:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:21450504 New window
DOI:10.1038/srep11027 New window
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:YSZFHLCR
Publication date in DKUM:23.06.2017
Views:967
Downloads:400
Metadata:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Categories:Misc.
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Record is a part of a journal

Title:Scientific reports
Shortened title:Sci. rep.
Publisher:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 New window

Document is financed by a project

Funder:ARRS - Slovenian Research Agency
Project number:P5-0027
Name:Prilagajanje slovenskega gospodarstva in razvojna identiteta Slovenije v EU

Licences

License:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Link:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Description:This is the standard Creative Commons license that gives others maximum freedom to do what they want with the work as long as they credit the author.
Licensing start date:09.06.2016

Secondary language

Language:Slovenian
Keywords:zločin, fazni prehod, socialna dilema, fizika socioloških sistemov


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