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Naslov:A double-edged sword: benefits and pitfalls of heterogeneous punishment in evolutionary inspection games
Avtorji:ID Perc, Matjaž (Avtor)
ID Szolnoki, Attila (Avtor)
Datoteke:.pdf Scientific_Reports_2015_Perc,_Szolnoki_A_double-edged_sword_Benefits_and_pitfalls_of_heterogeneous_punishment_in_evolutionary_inspection.pdf (1,62 MB)
MD5: 33E4AAB424674122A3A3EAB2A1AD5C81
 
URL http://www.nature.com/articles/srep11027
 
Jezik:Angleški jezik
Vrsta gradiva:Znanstveno delo
Tipologija:1.01 - Izvirni znanstveni članek
Organizacija:FNM - Fakulteta za naravoslovje in matematiko
Opis:As a simple model for criminal behavior, the traditional two-strategy inspection game yields counterintuitive results that fail to describe empirical data. The latter shows that crime is often recurrent, and that crime rates do not respond linearly to mitigation attempts. A more apt model entails ordinary people who neither commit nor sanction crime as the third strategy besides the criminals and punishers. Since ordinary people free-ride on the sanctioning efforts of punishers, they may introduce cyclic dominance that enables the coexistence of all three competing strategies. In this setup ordinary individuals become the biggest impediment to crime abatement. We therefore also consider heterogeneous punisher strategies, which seek to reduce their investment into fighting crime in order to attain a more competitive payoff. We show that this diversity of punishment leads to an explosion of complexity in the system, where the benefits and pitfalls of criminal behavior are revealed in the most unexpected ways. Due to the raise and fall of different alliances no less than six consecutive phase transitions occur in dependence on solely the temptation to succumb to criminal behavior, leading the population from ordinary people-dominated across punisher-dominated to crime-dominated phases, yet always failing to abolish crime completely.
Ključne besede:crime, phase transition, social dilemma, physics of social systems
Status publikacije:Objavljeno
Verzija publikacije:Objavljena publikacija
Leto izida:2015
Št. strani:str. 1-11
Številčenje:Letn. 5
PID:20.500.12556/DKUM-60185 Novo okno
ISSN:2045-2322
UDK:53
COBISS.SI-ID:21450504 Novo okno
DOI:10.1038/srep11027 Novo okno
ISSN pri članku:2045-2322
NUK URN:URN:SI:UM:DK:YSZFHLCR
Datum objave v DKUM:23.06.2017
Število ogledov:957
Število prenosov:400
Metapodatki:XML RDF-CHPDL DC-XML DC-RDF
Področja:Ostalo
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Vaša ocena:Ocenjevanje je dovoljeno samo prijavljenim uporabnikom.
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Gradivo je del revije

Naslov:Scientific reports
Skrajšan naslov:Sci. rep.
Založnik:Nature Publishing Group
ISSN:2045-2322
COBISS.SI-ID:18727432 Novo okno

Gradivo je financirano iz projekta

Financer:ARRS - Agencija za raziskovalno dejavnost Republike Slovenije
Številka projekta:P5-0027
Naslov:Prilagajanje slovenskega gospodarstva in razvojna identiteta Slovenije v EU

Licence

Licenca:CC BY 4.0, Creative Commons Priznanje avtorstva 4.0 Mednarodna
Povezava:http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.sl
Opis:To je standardna licenca Creative Commons, ki daje uporabnikom največ možnosti za nadaljnjo uporabo dela, pri čemer morajo navesti avtorja.
Začetek licenciranja:09.06.2016

Sekundarni jezik

Jezik:Slovenski jezik
Ključne besede:zločin, fazni prehod, socialna dilema, fizika socioloških sistemov


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