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Abstract: In this paper, we define characteristic axioms for 3D matrix games and extend the definitions of the decision criteria under uncertainty to three dimensions in order to investigate the simultaneous effect of two different states on the decision process. We first redefine the Laplace, Wald, Hurwicz, and Savage criteria in 3D. We present a new definition depending on only the ∞-norm of the 3D payoff matrix for the Laplace criterion in 3D. Then, we demonstrate that the Laplace criterion in 3D explicitly satisfies all the proposed axioms, as well as the other three criteria. Moreover, we illustrate a fundamental example for a three-dimensional matrix with 3D figures and show the usage of each criterion in detail. In the second example, we model a decision process during the COVID-19 pandemic for South Korea to show the applicability of the 3D decision criteria using real data with two different states of nature for individuals’ actions for the quarantine. Additionally, we present an agricultural insurance problem and analyze the effects of the hailstorm and different speeds of wind on the harvest by the 3D criteria. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that brings 3D matrices in decision and game theories together.
Keywords: game theory, decision criteria, matrix game, common goods, characteristic axioms, multi-state games, three-dimensional matrix games, game against nature, COVID-19, insurance problem
Published in DKUM: 27.05.2024; Views: 229; Downloads: 11
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Abstract: We study the impact of evolutionary games on the flow of traffic. Since traffic participants do not always conform to the imposed rules, the introduction of games, i.e. set of strategies defining the behavioural pattern of agents on the road, appears justified. With this motivation, and the fact that individuals can change their strategy in the course of time, the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game is introduced between neighbouring agents, enabling them to choose between cooperation and defection. Mutual cooperation enables forwarding to both agents for one step, while the defector is able to advance two steps when facing a cooperator, whereby the latter is forced to go one step backwards. Two defectors end up in a halt until the next iteration. Irrespective of their strategy, however, agents can move only if the road ahead is free. Jumps are never allowed. We show that this simple and plausible supplementation of the discrete cellular automaton Biham-Middleton-Levine (BML) model induces a traffic flow seizure by a substantially lower initial density of cars as in the absence of evolutionary games. The phenomenon is explained by studying the one-dimensional variant of the BML model with different advancement steps on the circular ring. In view of the proposed explanation, findings are generalized also to other types of games, such is the snowdrift game, and some statistical properties of gridlock formation in the presence of evolutionary rules are outlined. Our findings suggest that 'bending the law' results in a premature occurrence of traffic jams and thus unnecessarily burdens the transportation system.
Keywords: dynamic systems, traffic flow, theory of games, evolutionary rules, flow simulations, prisoner's dilemma
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 1136; Downloads: 400
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Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Published in DKUM: 30.06.2017; Views: 1738; Downloads: 413
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Abstract: To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hopeof successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player uniformly at random. Here we introduce a parameter that interpolates between these two extreme options. Setting equal to zero returns the random selection of the opponent, while positive favor the fitter players. In addition, we divide the population intotwo groups. Players from group select their opponents as dictated by the parameter , while players from group do so randomly irrespective of . We denote the fraction of players contained in groups and by and , respectively. The two parameters and allow us to analyze in detail how aspirations in the context of the prisoner's dilemma game influence the evolution of cooperation. We find that for sufficiently positive values of there exist a robust intermediate for which cooperation thrives best. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction networks. We also provide complete phase diagrams depicting the dependence of the impact of and for different values of , and contrast the validity of ourconclusions by means of an alternative model where individual aspiration levels are subject to evolution as well. Our study indicates that heterogeneity in aspirations may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, aspirations, social systems, physics and society
Published in DKUM: 19.06.2017; Views: 1476; Downloads: 382
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Abstract: We study effects of additive spatiotemporal random variations, introduced to the payoffs of a spatial hawk-dove game, on the evolution of the reconciliatory and the aggressive strategy. We show that uncertainties facilitate aggressive behavior for a broad range of resource values. In particular, aggressors thrive best if stochastic influences are of the order of magnitude of deterministic payoff values. We argue that random payoff variations are potent and plausible promoters of aggressive behavior in human as well as animal societies if only the hawk-dove game payoff ranking applies.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, hawk-dove game, noise, spatial games
Published in DKUM: 31.05.2012; Views: 2231; Downloads: 64
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