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Time delays shape the eco‑evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
Sourav Roy, Sayantan Nag Chowdhury, Srilena Kundu, Gourab Kumar Sar, Jeet Banerjee, Biswambhar Rakshit, Prakash Chandra Mali, Matjaž Perc, Dibakar Ghosh, 2023, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the intricate interplay between ecological and evolutionary processes through the lens of the prisoner’s dilemma game. But while previous studies on cooperation amongst selfsh individuals often assume instantaneous interactions, we take into consideration delays to investigate how these might afect the causes underlying prosocial behavior. Through analytical calculations and numerical simulations, we demonstrate that delays can lead to oscillations, and by incorporating also the ecological variable of altruistic free space and the evolutionary strategy of punishment, we explore how these factors impact population and community dynamics. Depending on the parameter values and the initial fraction of each strategy, the studied eco-evolutionary model can mimic a cyclic dominance system and even exhibit chaotic behavior, thereby highlighting the importance of complex dynamics for the efective management and conservation of ecological communities. Our research thus contributes to the broader understanding of group decision-making and the emergence of moral behavior in multidimensional social systems.
Ključne besede: cooperation, time delay, evolutionary dynamics, social dilemma, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 04.04.2024; Ogledov: 39; Prenosov: 0
.pdf Celotno besedilo (5,28 MB)
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Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the secondorder free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
Ključne besede: social dynamics, networks, punishment, public goods, econophysics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1119; Prenosov: 399
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,52 MB)
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Costly hide and seek pays : unexpected consequences of deceit in a social dilemma
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.
Ključne besede: social dynamics, deceit, evolutionary games, public goods, econophysics, cooperation
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1034; Prenosov: 171
.pdf Celotno besedilo (580,42 KB)
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A methodology for improving strategic decisions in social systems with a lack of information
Carlos A. Legna Verna, Andrej Škraba, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: The design of strategies for social systems requires the use of qualitative information owing to the fact that quantitative information can be insufficient to solve the problems involved. The information that the specialists and the decision makers obtain is often incomplete and unreliable. Nevertheless, leaders have to make strategic decisions despite these deficiencies which should be based on the formal models (Kljajić et al. 2000; Škraba et al, 2003; Škraba et al 2007). This paper describes a methodology elaborated to design the strategy of the city of Santa Cruz (on the Canary Islands). It has two main sections: the elaboration of a qualitative model and the use of System Dynamics. We combine them in a way that allows mixing qualitative and quantitative information to achieve a better understanding of the structure of the region, to know the tendencies of the present scenario and to estimate of the effects of alternative strategic decisions. We have obtained these results working with scarce quantitative information. This methodology may be applied to any social systems with similar characteristics.
Ključne besede: qualitative models, system dynamics, social strategies
Objavljeno v DKUM: 10.07.2015; Ogledov: 926; Prenosov: 319
.pdf Celotno besedilo (668,60 KB)
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