1. The analysis of active bribery in positive criminal law of Germany and AustriaMijo Galiot, 2017, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: The criminal policy of preventing the commission of crimes, especially corruption and bribery, is of great importance for every regulated legal system. The success of the named policy depends largely on the overall political and economic development of each country. In support of the existing scientific debate, this paper analyses the positive criminal law regulation of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Republic of Austria with regard to the question of active bribery as one of the main forms of corrupt behaviour. The author will comparatively present the German and Austrian criminal systems, which, same as the Croatian, belong to European continental criminal legal system, and will thus address the fundamental similarities and differences between the legal regulations of active bribery within the named legislations.
Ključne besede: benefit, corruption, active bribery, prosecution, punishment, criminal sanctions
Objavljeno v DKUM: 02.08.2018; Ogledov: 1113; Prenosov: 99
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2. Second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishmentAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2017, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order free-riding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that noncooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here, we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does is viable, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order free-riding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.
Ključne besede: complex systems, interdisciplinary physics, punishment, cooperation
Objavljeno v DKUM: 13.11.2017; Ogledov: 1081; Prenosov: 447
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3. Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategiesAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.08.2017; Ogledov: 1276; Prenosov: 368
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4. Tax compliance and social security contributions : the case of SloveniaTomaž Lešnik, Davorin Kračun, Timotej Jagrič, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: In this paper, we will examine the causes behind the higher level of compliance with social security contributions in comparison with other tax categories in the case of Slovenia. The results of econometric models suggest that the activities of the Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, which were more stringently performed in the area of social security contributions in the most recent period, are an important - but not the only factor - behind the higher level of compliance in connection with social security contributions. At the same time, the decrease in tax compliance with other taxes (income tax, corporate income tax, and VAT) did not essentially influence the higher level of compliance with social security contributions. The more consistent treatment of unpaid social security contributions as a criminal offence and the higher public awareness about the importance of paying social security contributions in the latest period are recognized as important factors which simultaneously constitute the main difference between social security contributions and other taxes. The higher level of public awareness about the benefits that result from public services financed with taxes is recognized as a possible way to more optimally collect taxes in Slovenia.
Ključne besede: social security contributions, activities of the Tax Administration of the Republic of Slovenia, tax compliance, punishment, public awareness
Objavljeno v DKUM: 14.07.2017; Ogledov: 1806; Prenosov: 92
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5. Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environmentsXiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.
Ključne besede: public cooperation, institutional reciprocity, scale-free network, punishment, reward
Objavljeno v DKUM: 10.07.2017; Ogledov: 1552; Prenosov: 421
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6. Self-organization of punishment in structured populationsMatjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1203; Prenosov: 433
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7. Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods gameDirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1855; Prenosov: 405
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8. Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishmentXiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the secondorder free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
Ključne besede: social dynamics, networks, punishment, public goods, econophysics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1274; Prenosov: 421
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9. Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewardingAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, reward, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1643; Prenosov: 419
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10. Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-ridersMatjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, institutions, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1512; Prenosov: 368
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