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Abstract: One of the main reasons there is so much junk in education is that there are so few people who know enough about education and about the sciences that support education, i.e. philosophy, cognitive and neuroscience to put the thing together. Educators have been reliant upon others’ expertise for the interpretations from contemporary science hence have not been able to discern whether the claims made are valid or invalid representations of the research. Without a direct access to the primary research educators may be at risk of misusing results from this advanced research. The need for so called ‘mediator’ in the translation of research to practice has led to a situation where the application of cognitive neuroscience research findings is running ahead of the research itself. The overall objective is to produce an integrated approach to problems of connection Education with the contemporary knowledge from the area of Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science, Psychology, Neuroscience, Cognitive modelling and Artificial Intelligence.
Keywords: education, philosophy of mind
Published in DKUM: 15.12.2017; Views: 2469; Downloads: 197
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Abstract: The paper is a critical examination of Peacocke's pioneering work on concepts as grounding the possibility of a priori knowledge. It focuses upon his more recent turn to reference and referential domain, and the two enlargements of the purely conceptual bases for apriority, namely appeal to conceptions and to direct referential sensitivity. I argue that the two are needed, but they produce more problem for the strategy as a whole than they solve. I conclude by suggesting that they point to a possible Benacerraf-like dilemma for conceptualists accounts of armchair knowledge: if concepts are akin to representational contents and/or conceptions, they certainly do not metaphysically determine anything. At best, they fallibly guide our inquiry, and get corrected almost by each new important discovery about the nature of their referents. If what is meant by "concept" is a Fregean, objectively correct and metaphysically potent entity, there is little doubt in its power to determine its referent(s), but, there is a huge epistemic problem of how we grasp such Platonic concepts. Peacocke's early metaphysics of concept, which offered beginnings of an answer, is put in jeopardy by the new referential turn, and his valiant attempts to pass between the multiple horns of this dilemma seem to face a lot of difficulties.
Keywords: analytical philosophy, conceptualism, predeterminism, apriority, concepts
Published in DKUM: 07.06.2012; Views: 2433; Downloads: 115
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