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1.
Calculation of price reduction in international sale of goods contracts
Sandra Fišer Šobot, 2017, original scientific article

Abstract: Price reduction is a part of The United Nation Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods remedial scheme and is available to the buyer if delivered goods are not in conformity with the sales contract. Price reduction is a very suitable remedy and offers numerous advantages in comparison to other remedies. It is widely used in practice. However, diverging scholarly interpretations and relevant case law show that there are some ambiguities and uncertainties as to its calculation. This paper will examine relevant issues regarding the calculation of price reduction.
Keywords: international sale of goods, CISG, buyer's remedies, non-conformity, price reduction, calculation of price reduction
Published in DKUM: 15.01.2021; Views: 233; Downloads: 14
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2.
Different approaches to cross border mobility of patients in the European Union in Czechia, Slovakia and Poland
Filip Křepelka, 2016, original scientific article

Abstract: Poland and Slovakia are neighbour countries with similar history and socioeconomic conditions. They share heritage of socialized healthcare. Nevertheless, they adopted different policies towards promotion of patients´ mobility in the European Union. Accession to coordination of social security establishing assistance for tourists was smooth. Providers offer quality care for good prices. Foreign patients come to all three countries. Right for reimbursement of treatment intentionally sought across borders was created by the Court of Justice already before their accession. Nevertheless, they already decided on the Patients´ directive. Czechia supported it, Slovakia abstained and Poland refused. Numerous Poles seek treatment abroad and ask for its reimbursement, while implementing legislation barely complies and authorities are tight-fisted. Few Slovaks do it in accordance with rules adopted with cautiousness. Czechs ignore this opportunity despite official benevolence. Quality of healthcare, various price-setting and peculiarities of public financing explain this difference.
Keywords: European Union, free movement of services and goods, medical tourism, public financing of healthcare, patients' rights
Published in DKUM: 09.10.2018; Views: 637; Downloads: 49
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3.
Calculation of price reduction in international sale of goods contracts
Sandra Fišer Šobot, 2017, original scientific article

Abstract: Price reduction is a part of The United Nation Convention on Contract for the International Sale of Goods remedial scheme and is available to the buyer if delivered goods are not in conformity with the sales contract. Price reduction is a very suitable remedy and offers numerous advantages in comparison to other remedies. It is widely used in practice. However, diverging scholarly interpretations and relevant case law show that there are some ambiguities and uncertainties as to its calculation. This paper will examine relevant issues regarding the calculation of price reduction.
Keywords: international sale of goods, CISG, buyer’s remedies, non- conformity, price reduction, calculation of price reduction
Published in DKUM: 02.08.2018; Views: 652; Downloads: 70
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4.
The urban dimension of logistics
Darja Topolšek, Tina Cvahte, 2016, independent scientific component part or a chapter in a monograph

Keywords: logistics, urban centres, city logistics, delivery of goods, supply chain
Published in DKUM: 09.05.2018; Views: 658; Downloads: 57
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5.
Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks
Federico Battiston, Matjaž Perc, Vito Latora, 2017, original scientific article

Abstract: Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.
Keywords: cooperation, public goods, networks, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 04.12.2017; Views: 664; Downloads: 322
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6.
An empirical study regarding radical innovation, research and development management, and leadership
Fumihiko Isada, Yuriko Isada, 2017, original scientific article

Abstract: The objective of this research is to empirically compare the management that is most suitable for radical innovation with that needed for incremental innovation. The relationship between the results of research and development and management styles was surveyed using a questionnaire. Respondents included research and development leaders in Japanese manufacturing, with special attention given to the differences between radical innovation and incremental innovation. Results verified, in an integrated way, the management and leadership factors, taking into consideration the differences arising from the object under analysis and the environmental factors.
Keywords: radical innovation, incremental innovation, research and development management, leadership, size of the firm, technology life cycle, kinds of goods
Published in DKUM: 03.11.2017; Views: 762; Downloads: 319
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7.
Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, original scientific article

Abstract: Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Keywords: public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 03.08.2017; Views: 700; Downloads: 298
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8.
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2012, original scientific article

Abstract: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.
Keywords: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 725; Downloads: 350
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9.
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 1029; Downloads: 335
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10.
Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, original scientific article

Abstract: Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the secondorder free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
Keywords: social dynamics, networks, punishment, public goods, econophysics
Published in DKUM: 03.07.2017; Views: 755; Downloads: 342
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