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1.
Noise-guided evolution within cyclical interactions
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2007, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study a stochastic predator-prey model on a square lattice, where each of the six species has two superior and two inferior partners. The invasion probabilities between species depend on the predator-prey pair and are supplemented by Gaussian noise. Conditions are identified that warrant the largest impact of noise on the evolutionary process, and the results of Monte Carlo simulations are qualitatively reproduced by a four-point cluster dynamical mean-field approximation. The observed noise-guided evolution is deeply routed in short-range spatial correlations, which is supported by simulations on other host lattice topologies. Our findings are conceptually related to the coherence resonance phenomenon in dynamical systems via the mechanism of threshold duality. We also show that the introduced concept of noise-guided evolution via the exploitation of threshold duality is not limited to predator-prey cyclical interactions, but may apply to models of evolutionary game theory as well, thus indicating its applicability in several different fields of research.
Ključne besede: dynamic systems, stochastic processes, cyclical interactions, evolutionary rules, flow simulations, Monte Carlo simulations
Objavljeno: 07.06.2012; Ogledov: 1136; Prenosov: 199
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2.
Premature seizure of traffic flow due to the introduction of evolutionary games
Matjaž Perc, 2007, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the impact of evolutionary games on the flow of traffic. Since traffic participants do not always conform to the imposed rules, the introduction of games, i.e. set of strategies defining the behavioural pattern of agents on the road, appears justified. With this motivation, and the fact that individuals can change their strategy in the course of time, the evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game is introduced between neighbouring agents, enabling them to choose between cooperation and defection. Mutual cooperation enables forwarding to both agents for one step, while the defector is able to advance two steps when facing a cooperator, whereby the latter is forced to go one step backwards. Two defectors end up in a halt until the next iteration. Irrespective of their strategy, however, agents can move only if the road ahead is free. Jumps are never allowed. We show that this simple and plausible supplementation of the discrete cellular automaton Biham-Middleton-Levine (BML) model induces a traffic flow seizure by a substantially lower initial density of cars as in the absence of evolutionary games. The phenomenon is explained by studying the one-dimensional variant of the BML model with different advancement steps on the circular ring. In view of the proposed explanation, findings are generalized also to other types of games, such is the snowdrift game, and some statistical properties of gridlock formation in the presence of evolutionary rules are outlined. Our findings suggest that 'bending the law' results in a premature occurrence of traffic jams and thus unnecessarily burdens the transportation system.
Ključne besede: dynamic systems, traffic flow, theory of games, evolutionary rules, flow simulations, prisoner's dilemma
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 250; Prenosov: 179
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,17 MB)
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