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1.
Some sociological, medical and legislative views on video game addiction
Jana Goriup, Aleksander Arnuš, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Millions of people worldwide play video games; also in Slovenian post-modern society. Most of them do it for enjoyment, yet a small number of individuals show traits associated with addictive behaviour when interacting with their games. The authors in the article point out that, compared to drug abuse, there exist some more approachable life-related activities that can lead to addiction. They stimulate the excretion of endorphins and lead to the transformation of consciousness. Addiction to video games is an ostensible attempt to satisfy the immanent human need for meaning. The economy of the Slovenian young consumer society inspires it and is based on "learning" of these alienated needs. The modern hyperpragmatic society makes it possible for young people to have a fragmented identity and places them under the pressure of constant choice of (formally open opportunities). The purpose of this paper is to familiarize the reader with possible causes, clinical signs and methods of treatment of this disorder in Slovenian post-modern society, and explain the reasons why currently no medical textbook in the world contains any information regarding video game addiction. We intend, further, to demonstrate that gaming has become a type of "sport" in certain countries and demonstrate how potentially devastating even this type of addiction can be. The authors present the results of a research, which was undertaken on a sample of 350 individuals, to determine the appearance of indicators of behavioural addiction to video games and their connection with some family factors. They determine that through addiction to video games, post-modern societies have developed an addictive identity.
Ključne besede: addiction, video games, risk-reward, parenting, peers, death, leagues, help centers, twelve-step programs
Objavljeno: 30.03.2017; Ogledov: 440; Prenosov: 44
.pdf Celotno besedilo (525,48 KB)
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2.
Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, reward, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 478; Prenosov: 121
.pdf Celotno besedilo (2,15 MB)
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3.
Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
Xiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.
Ključne besede: public cooperation, institutional reciprocity, scale-free network, punishment, reward
Objavljeno: 10.07.2017; Ogledov: 330; Prenosov: 148
.pdf Celotno besedilo (3,26 MB)
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4.
Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.08.2017; Ogledov: 197; Prenosov: 100
.pdf Celotno besedilo (667,46 KB)
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