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1.
Tveganje v bančništvu in njihovo upravljanje
Terezija Branda, 2009, undergraduate thesis

Abstract: Banke igrajo ključno vlogo v nacionalnih ekonomijah večine držav po svetu. Zdrav bančni sistem je pomemben element finančne stabilnosti, ki pomeni osnovo za vzdževanje in razvoj gospodarskega sistema. Osnovna funkcija bančnega sistema je finančno posredništvo: zbiranje finančnih sredstev od tistih, ki imajo presežke in njihovo posojanje tistim podjetjem ali posamezniku, ki jih potrebujejo. Prevzemanje tveganj je neločljivo povezano z bančništvom, pomanjkljivo zavedanje in upravljanje s tveganji pa lahko vodi v izgubo in ogrozi varnost bančnih vlog. Zaradi pomembne vloge v nacionalni ekonomiji in zaupanja, ki ga imajo vlagatelji v banke, morajo te poslovati skrbno in varno ter vzdrževati primeren nivo kapitala in rezervacij za zaščito pred morebitnimi tveganji, ki izhajajo iz poslovanja. Vse banke so v ta namen podvržene nadzoru s strani države za to pooblaščenih institucij. V zadnjih letih je finančni sektor doživel mnogo sprememb. Današnji bančni sistem zaznamujejo predvsem: * naraščajoči obsegi trgovalnih aktivnosti, * razvoj finančnih instrumentov, * pojav globalizacije (24-urni trgi), * povezovanje finančnih institucij, * kompleksni poslovni odnosi z največjimi strankami, * podružnice postajajo prodajna mesta za vrsto različnih produktov, * naraščajoča odvisnost od informacijske tehnologije, * vse bolj zahtevna regulativa. Našteti dejavniki so botrovali vse hitrejšemu razvoju novih finančnih instrumentov, vzporedno s katerimi se pojavljajo nove oblike tveganj, ki so bolj kompleksne in manj transparentne. Če so v preteklosti finančni in računovodski izkazi bank služili kot osnovno orodje za ocenjevanje varnosti in finančne moči banke, postaja danes njihova izrazna moč v smislu tveganosti banke vse bolj omejena. Analiza stanj na presežne datume ne zagotavlja več ustrezne slike glede dejanske tveganosti banke. Spremembam bančne prakse mora slediti tudi nadzorna praksa, ki se iz pregleda usklajenosti z zakonodajo razširja na ugotavljanje in ocenjevanje tveganj. Ker pa je tveganje rezultat kombinacije izpostavljenosti pripadajočemu tveganju in zmanjševanju le – tega z notranjimi kontrolami, so predmet ocenjevanja poleg pripadajočega tveganja tudi notranje kontrole. Bančni nadzornik, ki po funkciji sam sicer ni nagnjen k prevzemanju tveganj, razume, da je temelj bančništva v prevzemanju tveganj in da bo banka vedno izpostavljena določenemu obsegu tveganja. Pomembno pri tem pa je, da se banka zaveda tveganja in da ima vzpostavljene ustrezne obrambne mehanizme za njegovo obvladovanje. Banke so zadnja leta izvedle pomembne investicije v razvoj novih metodologij, procedur in kontrol z namenom boljšega identificiranja, merjenja in upravljanja tveganj. Vendar pa vzpostavljanje notranjih kontrol ni enkraten proces, ampak jih je treba redno pregledovati, preverjati in po potrebi nadgrajevati. Upravljanje s kapitalom je zelo pomemben del strateškega planiranja vsake banke. Prenizka raven kapitala lahko banko izpostavlja prekomernemu tveganju propada, po drugi strani pa previsok kapital banko sili k dvigovanju marž in provizij, da bi lahko zagotovila delničarjem primeren donos na vložena sredstva. Banka mora imeti vzpostavljen takšen proces upravljanja s kapitalom, ki bo zajel vsa materialna tveganja, ki se jim izpostavlja in bo pravočasno zaznaval spremembe v posamezni vrsti tveganja in temu ustrezno tudi prilagajal obseg razpoložljivega kapitala. Vzpostavljanje pisne strategije, politike in procedure predstavljajo del notranjih kontrol, ki lahko bistveno zmanjšajo kapitalsko tveganje banke. Interne politike in procedure morajo postati strateški element upravljanja s tveganjem, pri čemer je potrebno doseči, da se bodo dosledno izvajale in ne bodo same sebi namen.
Keywords: * advanced measurement approach – napredni pristop * basic indicator approach – enostavni pristop * capital adequacy – kapitalska usreznost * compliance – skladnost s predpisi * inherent risk – pripadajoče tveganje * internal auditing – notranje revidiranje * moral hazard – moralno tveganje * off-site supervision – zunanji nadzor * on-site supervision – notranji nadzor * risk-based supervision – nadzor, ki temelji na tveganju * standardised a
Published: 03.07.2009; Views: 2309; Downloads: 225
.pdf Full text (613,93 KB)

2.
THE ROLE OF THE RATING AGENCIES IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
Petar Filipov, 2012, undergraduate thesis

Abstract: The Subprime crisis that occurred in 2007-2008, was the most disturbing and severe crisis since The Great Depression. The global stock market indexes and housing prices noted a sharp drop. Big corporations, conglomerates, defaulted, were acquired and bailed out, since they could not meet their financing obligations. Substantial number of people lost their jobs worldwide and a lot of sectors in the economy were struggling. Within this Bachelor seminar paper, it is presented how the credit rating agencies influenced the credit crunch. The main issue discussed in this seminar work is the role of the rating agencies in one of the greatest crushes in history. They (the agencies), actually, participated in creating the structured financial products, which during the housing bubble were increasingly trading. These structured financial products were very complex and highly risky and maybe, the most crucial cause of the crisis. First, in the seminar paper it is described how the agencies work and their origins. As in the last century, Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s, emerged to great power in the financial system with assigning ratings to issuers of debt. This position in the financial world that the agencies held, has brought many academicians to doubting the possible moral hazard problems within the credit ratings business. Furthermore, it is explained how the financial turmoil emerged and the trends that preceded the credit crunch. Questions regarding the role of the agencies in the securitization process are discussed. For instance, were the rating agencies biased; were the ratings on the structured financial products inflated and if so, what were the incentives for it? Several theories and empirical evidence has been put forward concerning the importance of the ratings in the securitization process. It is concluded in this paper, that the ratings assigned to the financial derivatives were inflated and the agencies noted increased returns from it, which presents the incentives of the agencies during the housing bubble. These empirical findings also indicate of moral hazard problem within the ratings system.
Keywords: Credit rating agencies, Financial crisis, Structured financial products, Securitization, Inflated ratings, Moral hazard
Published: 29.11.2012; Views: 1012; Downloads: 70
.pdf Full text (749,27 KB)

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4.
Evolutionary establishment of moral and double moral standards through spatial interactions
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: Situations where individuals have to contribute to joint efforts or share scarce resources are ubiquitous. Yet, without proper mechanisms to ensure cooperation, the evolutionary pressure to maximize individual success tends to create a tragedy of the commons (such as over-fishing or the destruction of our environment). This contribution addresses a number of related puzzles of human behavior with an evolutionary game theoretical approach as it has been successfully used to explain the behavior of other biological species many times, from bacteria to vertebrates. Our agent-based model distinguishes individuals applying four different behavioral strategies: non-cooperative individuals ('defectors'), cooperative individuals abstaining from punishment efforts (called 'cooperators' or 'second-order free-riders'), cooperators who punish non-cooperative behavior ('moralists'), and defectors, who punish otherdefectors despite being non-cooperative themselves ('immoralists'). By considering spatial interactions with neighboring individuals, our model reveals several interesting effects: First, moralists can fully eliminate cooperators. This spreading of punishing behavior requires a segregation of behavioral strategies and solves the 'second-order free-rider problem'. Second, the system behavior changes its character significantly even after very long times ('who laughs last laughs best effect'). Third, the presence of a number of defectors can largely accelerate the victory of moralists over non-punishing cooperators. Fourth, in order to succeed, moralists may profit from immoralists in a way that appears like an 'unholy collaboration'. Our findings suggest that the consideration of punishment strategies allows one to understand the establishment and spreading of 'moral behavior' by means of game-theoretical concepts. This demonstrates that quantitative biological modeling approaches are powerful even in domains that have been addressed with non-mathematical concepts so far. The complex dynamics of certain social behaviors become understandable as the result of an evolutionary competition between different behavioral strategies.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, social dilemmas, spatial games, moral, cooperation
Published: 16.06.2017; Views: 434; Downloads: 235
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5.
PREPREČEVANJE SISTEMSKIH UTAJ DDV S POUDARKOM NA AKTIVNI DAVČNI OBRAVNAVI "KANALSKIH DRUŽB"
Mateja Škof Kurnik, 2016, master's thesis

Abstract: Goljufije na področju DDV se znotraj držav članic EU pojavljajo v različnih oblikah, od sive ekonomije, lažnih zahtevkov za vračilo, nezakonitih odbitkov, ... Splošno pravilo obdavčitve med državami članicami EU zagotavlja, da so dobave blaga v drugo državo članico EU obdavčene po stopnji in pogojih te namembne države članice EU. Takšna ureditev obdavčitve sistem DDV izpostavlja utajam. Najpogostejša vrsta utaje, ki izkorišča takšen sistem, je tako imenovana " Intra-Community Missing Trader " (MTIC) utaja – tukaj gre za kombinacijo domačih dobav znotraj države članice EU (DDV se obračuna), z dobavami med državami članicami EU (oproščene DDV). Takšne goljufije organizirajo kriminalne združbe. V zadnjih letih je opaziti vedno večje vključevanje trgovcev iz tretjih držav. Eden izmed pomembnejših subjektov v takšni dobavni verigi je tudi kanalska družba. To je družba, ki sodeluje v transakcijah, ki so vključene v davčno utajo v drugi državi. Njena naloga je, pridobiti blago iz ene države članice EU in ga dobaviti - kanalizirati v isto ali drugo državo članico EU. Iz sodb Sodišča Evropske unije je razvidno, da mora biti davčni zavezanec, ki je vedel ali bi moral vedeti, da je z nakupom sodeloval v transakciji, povezani z utajo, obravnavan kot udeleženec v tej goljufiji, ne glede na to, ali je od preprodaje blaga imel korist ali ne. Zaradi navedenega bi davčne uprave morale celovito aktivno davčno obravnavati kanalske družbe, tako na področju sprejemanja zakonodaje, ki bo preprečevala izvedbo utaje, na področju upravnega sodelovanja, kot tudi na področju odrekanja pravic kanalskim družbam v nadzornih postopkih, ki jim po sistemu DDV pripadajo (pravica do odbitka, pravica do oprostitve obračunavanja DDV), v kolikor so te vedele ali bi morale vedeti, da sodelujejo v sistemski utaji DDV. Boj proti utajam DDV zahteva tesno sodelovanje med državami članicami ter sodelovanje med davčnimi upravami, carino, policijo in tožilci, zahteva pa tudi učinkovite mehanizme za odkrivanje in preprečevanje davčnih utaj. MTIC utaje so organizirane s strani kriminalnih združb, zato je nujno potrebno te vrste utaj okvalificirati kot kazniva dejanja.
Keywords: DDV, sistemske utaje DDV, kanalska družba, neplačujoči gospodarski subjekt, mehanizmi za preprečevanje sistemskih utaj, vedel ali moral vedeti, davčna zatajitev.
Published: 18.11.2016; Views: 1112; Downloads: 102
.pdf Full text (1,81 MB)

6.
Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, original scientific article

Abstract: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Published: 03.07.2017; Views: 479; Downloads: 219
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7.
Communicating the neuroscience of psychopathy and its influence on moral behaviour
Robert Blakey, Adrian Dahl Askelund, Matilde Boccanera, Johanna Immonen, Nejc Plohl, Cassandra Popham, Clarissa Sorger, Julia Stuhlreyer, 2017, original scientific article

Abstract: Neuroscience has identified brain structures and functions that correlate with psychopathic tendencies. Since psychopathic traits can be traced back to physical neural attributes, it has been argued that psychopaths are not truly responsible for their actions and therefore should not be blamed for their psychopathic behaviors. This experimental research aims to evaluate what effect communicating this theory of psychopathy has on the moral behavior of lay people. If psychopathy is blamed on the brain, people may feel less morally responsible for their own psychopathic tendencies and therefore may be more likely to display those tendencies. An online study will provide participants with false feedback about their psychopathic traits supposedly based on their digital footprint (i. e., Facebook likes), thus classifying them as having either above-average or below-average psychopathic traits and describing psychopathy in cognitive or neurobiological terms. This particular study will assess the extent to which lay people are influenced by feedback regarding their psychopathic traits, and how this might affect their moral behavior in online tasks. Public recognition of these potential negative consequences of neuroscience communication will also be assessed. A field study using the lost letter technique will be conducted to examine lay people's endorsement of neurobiological, as compared to cognitive, explanations of criminal behavior. This field and online experimental research could inform the future communication of neuroscience to the public in a way that is sensitive to the potential negative consequences of communicating such science. In particular, this research may have implications for the future means by which neurobiological predictors of offending can be safely communicated to offenders.
Keywords: neuroscience communication, psychopathy, moral behaviour, dishonesty
Published: 23.01.2018; Views: 571; Downloads: 41
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