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1.
Vesiculation of biological membrane driven by curvature induced frustrations in membrane orientational ordering
Dalija Povše Jesenek, Šárka Perutková, Wojciech Góźdź, Veronika Kralj-Iglič, Aleš Iglič, Samo Kralj, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Membrane budding often leads to the formation and release of microvesicles. The latter might play an important role in long distance cell-to-cell communication, owing to their ability to move with body fluids. Several mechanisms exist which might trigger the pinching off of globular buds from the parent membrane (vesiculation). In this paper, we consider the theoretical impacts of topological defects (frustrations) on this process in the membranes that exhibit global in-plane orientational order. A Landau–de Gennes theoretical approach is used in terms of tensor orientational order parameters. The impact of membrane shapes on position and the number of defects is analyzed. In studied cases, only defects with winding numbers m = ±1/2 appear, where we refer to the number of defects with m = 1/2 as defects, and with m = –1/2 as anti-defects. It is demonstrated that defects are attracted to regions with maximal positive Gaussian curvature, K. On the contrary, anti-defects are attracted to membrane regions exhibiting minimal negative values of K. We show on membrane structures exhibiting spherical topology that the coexistence of regions with K > 0 and K < 0 might trigger formation of defect–anti-defect pairs for strong enough local membrane curvatures. Critical conditions for triggering pairs are determined in several demonstrative cases. Then the additionally appeared anti-defects are assembled at the membrane neck, where K < 0. Consequent strong local fluctuations of membrane constituent anisotropic molecules might trigger membrane fission neck rupture, enabling a membrane fission process and the release of membrane daughter microvesicles (ie, vesiculation).
Ključne besede: structural transitions, topological defects, membrane microvesicles, membrane curvature, membrane fission, vesiculation
Objavljeno: 03.08.2017; Ogledov: 531; Prenosov: 317
.pdf Celotno besedilo (4,92 MB)
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2.
Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.08.2017; Ogledov: 477; Prenosov: 255
.pdf Celotno besedilo (667,46 KB)
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3.
Vortices determine the dynamics of biodiversity in cyclical interactions with protection spillovers
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: If rock beats scissors and scissors beat paper, one might assume that rock beats paper too. But this is not the case for intransitive relationships that make up the famous rock-paper-scissors game. However, the sole presence of paper might prevent rock from beating scissors, simply because paper beats rock. This is the blueprint for the rock-paper-scissors game with protection spillovers, which has recently been introduced as a new paradigm for biodiversity in well-mixed microbial populations. Here we study the game in structured populations, demonstrating that protection spillovers give rise to spatial patterns that are impossible to observe in the classical rock-paper-scissors game.Weshow that the spatiotemporal dynamics of the system is determined by the density of stable vortices, which may ultimately transform to frozen states, to propagating waves, or to target waves with reversed propagation direction, depending further on the degree and type of randomness in the interactions among the species. If vortices are rare, the fixation to waves and complex oscillatory solutions is likelier. Moreover, annealed randomness in interactions favors the emergence of target waves, while quenched randomness favors collective synchronization. Our results demonstrate that protection spillovers may fundamentally change the dynamics of cyclic dominance in structured populations, and they outline the possibility of programming pattern formation in microbial populations.
Ključne besede: cyclical interactions, pattern formation, vortices, phase transitions, selforganization, biodiversity
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 494; Prenosov: 309
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,32 MB)
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4.
Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.
Ključne besede: coevolution, cooperation, interdependent networks, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, self-organization, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 598; Prenosov: 288
.pdf Celotno besedilo (887,51 KB)
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5.
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 552; Prenosov: 316
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,22 MB)
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6.
Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, reward, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 842; Prenosov: 311
.pdf Celotno besedilo (2,15 MB)
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7.
Smectic A herringbone patterns
Samo Kralj, Emmanuelle Lacaze, George Cordoyiannis, Zdravko Kutnjak, 2014, objavljeni znanstveni prispevek na konferenci

Opis: Two qualitatively different SmA structures exhibiting herringbone-type layer patterns, to which we refer as the Defectless Smectic Herringbone (DSH) and the Dislocation Decorated Smectic Herringbone (DDSH) pattern are studied by a Landau-de Gennes-Ginzburg mesoscopic approach. Liquid crystal structures are described in terms of a nematic director field and a smectic complex order parameter. It is demonstrated that, in the proximity of the N-SmA phase transition, a melting of smectic layers could be realised even for relatively weakly-tilted smectic layers in DSH patterns (i.e. θt ≈ 100) for type I Sm4 phase. The width of melted region could be relatively large with respect to bulk values of the smectic characteristic lengths. In addition, a critical value of θt is determined at which a DDSH pattern is expected to appear.
Ključne besede: liquid crystals, patterns, structural transitions
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 703; Prenosov: 285
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1005,99 KB)
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8.
Wisdom of groups promotes cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas
Attila Szolnoki, Zhen Wang, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Whether or not to change strategy depends not only on the personal success of each individual, but also on the success of others. Using this as motivation, we study the evolution of cooperation in games that describe social dilemmas, where the propensity to adopt a different strategy depends both on individual fitness as well as on the strategies of neighbors. Regardless of whether the evolutionary process is governed by pairwise or group interactions, we show that plugging into the wisdom of groups strongly promotes cooperative behavior. The more the wider knowledge is taken into account the more the evolution of defectors is impaired. We explain this by revealing a dynamically decelerated invasion process, by means of which interfaces separating different domains remain smooth and defectors therefore become unable to efficiently invade cooperators. This in turn invigorates spatial reciprocity and establishes decentralized decision making as very beneficial for resolving social dilemmas.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, wisdom of crowds, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 707; Prenosov: 254
.pdf Celotno besedilo (646,99 KB)
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9.
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, institutions, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 718; Prenosov: 274
.pdf Celotno besedilo (469,23 KB)
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10.
If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 607; Prenosov: 279
.pdf Celotno besedilo (413,53 KB)
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