1. Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviourAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content. Ključne besede: cooperation, information, social dilemma, public goods, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1258; Prenosov: 443 Celotno besedilo (756,59 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
2. Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groupsLuo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance. Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1795; Prenosov: 425 Celotno besedilo (665,03 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
3. Self-organization of progress across the century of physicsMatjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We make use of information provided in the titles and abstracts of over half a million publications that were published by the American Physical Society during the past 119 years. By identifying all unique words and phrases and determining their monthly usage patterns, we obtain quantifiable insights into the trends of physics discovery from the end of the 19th century to today. We show that the magnitudes of upward and downward trends yield heavy-tailed distributions, and that their emergence is due to the Matthew effect. This indicates that both the rise and fall of scientific paradigms is driven by robust principles of self-organization. Data also confirm that periods of war decelerate scientific progress, and that the later is very much subject to globalisation. Ključne besede: self-organization, preferential attachment, evolution of progress, history of physics, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1163; Prenosov: 355 Celotno besedilo (865,74 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
4. Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperationZhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality. Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1213; Prenosov: 384 Celotno besedilo (658,72 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
5. Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary gamesZhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed. Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1288; Prenosov: 397 Celotno besedilo (741,04 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
6. Effects of adaptive degrees of trust on coevolution of quantum strategies on scale-free networksQiang Li, Minyou Chen, Matjaž Perc, Azhar Iqbal, Derek Abbott, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We study the impact of adaptive degrees of trust on the evolution of cooperation in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game. In addition to the strategies, links between players are also subject to evolution. Starting with a scale-free interaction network, players adjust trust towards their neighbors based on received payoffs. The latter governs the strategy adoption process, while trust governs the rewiring of links. As soon as the degree of trust towards a neighbor drops to zero, the link is rewired to another randomly chosen player within the network. We find that for small temptations to defect cooperators always dominate, while for intermediate and strong temptations a single quantum strategy is able to outperform all other strategies. In general, reciprocal trust remains within close relationships and favors the dominance of a single strategy. Due to coevolution, the power-law degree distributions transform to Poisson distributions. Ključne besede: evolutionary games, quantum strategies, coevolution, random networks, cooperation, statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1021; Prenosov: 365 Celotno besedilo (669,03 KB) Gradivo ima več datotek! Več... |
7. Collective behavior and evolutionary games : an introductionMatjaž Perc, Paolo Grigolini, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek Ključne besede: kolektivni pojavi, evolucijske igre, fazni prehodi, kompleksne mreže, statistična fizika socioloških sistemov, collective phenomena, evolutionary games, phase transitions, complex networks, evolutionary statistical physics of social systems Objavljeno v DKUM: 10.07.2015; Ogledov: 1741; Prenosov: 48 Povezava na celotno besedilo |