Iskanje po katalogu digitalne knjižnice

Opis: Quantitative analysis of visual arts has recently expanded to encompass a more extensive array of artworks due to the availability of large-scale digitized art collections. Consistent with formal analyses by art historians, many of these studies highlight the significance of encoding spatial structures within artworks to enhance our understanding of visual arts. However, defining universally applicable, interpretable, and sufficiently simple units that capture the essence of paintings and their artistic styles remains challenging. Here, we examine ordering patterns in pixel intensities within two-by-two partitions of images from nearly 140,000 paintings created over the past 1,000 years. These patterns, categorized into 11 types based on arguments of continuity and symmetry, are both universally applicable and detailed enough to correlate with low-level visual features of paintings. We uncover a universal distribution of these patterns, with consistent prevalence within groups, yet modulated across groups by a nontrivial interplay between pattern smoothness and the likelihood of identical pixel intensities. This finding provides a standardized metric for comparing paintings and styles, further establishing a scale to measure deviations from the average prevalence. Our research also shows that these simple patterns carry valuable information for identifying painting styles, though styles generally exhibit considerable variability in the prevalence of ordinal patterns. Moreover, shifts in the prevalence of these patterns reveal a trend in which artworks increasingly diverge from the average incidence over time; however, this evolution is neither smooth nor uniform, with substantial variability in pattern prevalence, particularly after the 1930s.
Ključne besede: spatial patterns, complexity, esthetic measure, art history, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 01.04.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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Opis: According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, cooperation, learning, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.03.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 2
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Opis: Varying environmental conditions affect relations between interacting individuals in social dilemmas, thus affecting also the evolution of cooperation. Oftentimes these environmental variations are seasonal and can therefore be mathematically described as periodic changes. Accordingly, we here study how periodic shifts between different manifestations of social dilemmas affect cooperation. We observe a non-trivial interplay between the inherent spatiotemporal dynamics that characterizes the spreading of cooperation in a particular social dilemma type and the frequency of payoff changes. In particular, we show that periodic changes between two available games with global ordering best be fast, while periodic changes between global and local ordering games best be slow for cooperation to thrive. We also show that the frequency of periodic changes between two local ordering social dilemmas is irrelevant, because then the process is fast and simply the average cooperation level of the two is returned. The structure of the interaction network plays an important role too in that lattices promote local ordering, whilst random graphs hinder the formation of compact cooperative clusters. Conversely, for local ordering the regular structure of the interaction network is only marginally relevant as role-separating checkerboard patterns do not rely on long-range order.
Ključne besede: cooperation, social dilemma, social physics, phase transition, mixed games
Objavljeno v DKUM: 26.02.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 2
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Opis: Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Balls-and-Boxes problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing k identical co-players among n distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any n-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, cooperation, network, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 26.02.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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Opis: Inter-city interactions are critical for the transmission of infectious diseases, yet their effects on the scaling of disease cases remain largely underexplored. Here, we use the commuting network as a proxy for inter-city interactions, integrating it with a general scaling framework to describe the incidence of seven infectious diseases across Brazilian cities as a function of population size and the number of commuters. Our models significantly outperform traditional urban scaling approaches, revealing that the relationship between disease cases and a combination of population and commuters varies across diseases and is influenced by both factors. Although most cities exhibit a less-than-proportional increase in disease cases with changes in population and commuters, more-than-proportional responses are also observed across all diseases. Notably, in some small and isolated cities, proportional rises in population and commuters correlate with a reduction in disease cases. These findings suggest that such towns may experience improved health outcomes and socioeconomic conditions as they grow and become more connected. However, as growth and connectivity continue, these gains diminish, eventually giving way to challenges typical of larger urban areas - such as socioeconomic inequality and overcrowding - that facilitate the spread of infectious diseases. Our study underscores the interconnected roles of population size and commuter dynamics in disease incidence while highlighting that changes in population size exert a greater influence on disease cases than variations in the number of commuters.
Ključne besede: complex networks, statistical physics, interactions between cities, disease scaling, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 09.01.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 4
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