Iskanje po katalogu digitalne knjižnice

Opis: The thesis analyses two selected war speeches by former British Prime Ministers Winston Churchill and Boris Johnson by using appraisal theory based mainly on the work of James R. Martin and Peter R. R. White. Furthermore, it deals with the history of rhetoric, political oratory and the theory of war speeches. According to the latter, politicians and leaders try to strategically persuade their audiences that armed conflict is necessary to confront the supposed or actual aggressor to preserve sovereignty. ‘Arm Yourselves, and Be Ye Men of Valour’ by Winston Churchill marks a crucial moment in British history. On May 19, 1940, during the Second World War, Churchill addressed the British nation for the first time as Prime Minister. In his speech, he briefly explained the situation at the front, tried to appease the listeners and ensure victory over the aggressor. Contrarily, Boris Johnson’s address to the Ukrainian parliament was the first address by a foreign politician after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Similarly, Johnson ensured a victory for the Ukrainians with the help of the Allied countries. Afterward, he focused on his beliefs and the need to maintain a close relationship with Ukraine. The thesis attempts to quantitatively analyse the interpersonal meanings in speeches according to the categories of the appraisal system, as well as establish and compare the predominant features of British war oratory.
Ključne besede: Rhetoric, Appraisal Theory, British war speeches, Winston Churchill, Boris Johnson
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.10.2024; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 0
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Opis: Tourism is a growing sector worldwide, but many popular destinations are facing sustainability problems due to excessive tourist flows and inappropriate behavior. In these areas, there is an urgent need to apply mechanisms to stimulate sustainable practices. This paper studies the most efficient strategy to incentivize sustainable tourism by using an asymmetric evolutionary game. We analyze the application of rewarding policies to the asymmetric game where tourists and stakeholders interact in a spatial lattice, and where tourists can also migrate. The incentives of the rewarding policies have an economic budget which can be allocated to tourists, to stakeholders, or to both sub-populations. The results show that an adaptive rewarding strategy, where the incentive budget changes over time to one or the other sub-population, is more effective than simple rewarding strategies that are exclusively focused on one sub-population. However, when the population density in the game decreases, rewarding just tourists becomes the most effective strategy.
Ključne besede: rewarding, asymmetric game, migration, evolutionary game theory, sustainability, tourism
Objavljeno v DKUM: 24.07.2024; Ogledov: 111; Prenosov: 3
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Opis: A catacondensed polyhex H is a connected subgraph of a hexagonal system such that any edge of H lies in a hexagon of H, any triple of hexagons of H has an empty intersection and the inner dual of H is a cactus graph. A perfect matching M of a catacondensed polyhex H is relevant if every cycle of the inner dual of H admitsa vertex that corresponds to the hexagon which contributes three edges in M. The vertex set of the graph R˜(H) consists of all relevant perfect matchings of H, two perfect matchings being adjacent whenever their symmetric difference forms the edge set of a hexagon of H. A labeling that assigns in linear time a binary string to every relevant perfect matching of a catacondensed polyhex is presented. The introduced labeling defines an isometric embedding of R˜(H) into a hypercube.
Ključne besede: graphs, graph theory, resonance graphs
Objavljeno v DKUM: 07.06.2024; Ogledov: 99; Prenosov: 6
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Opis: Digital technologies provide a convenient way for the public to participate in environmental governance. Therefore, by means of a two-stage evolutionary model, a new mechanism for promoting public cooperation is proposed to accomplish environmental collaborative governance. Interactive effects of government-enterprise environmental governance are firstly explored, which is the external atmosphere for public behaviour. Second, the evolutionary dynamics of public behaviour is analysed to reveal the internal mechanism of the emergence of public cooperation in environmental collaborative governance projects. Simulations reveal that the interaction of resource elements between government and enterprise is an important basis for environmental governance performance, and that governments can improve this as well as public cooperation by increasing the marginal governance propensity. Similarly, an increase in the government's fixed expenditure item of environmental governance can also significantly improve government-enterprise performance and public cooperation. And finally, the effect of government's marginal incentive propensity on public environmental governance is moderated by enterprises' marginal environmental governance propensity, so that simply increasing the government's marginal incentive propensity cannot improve the evolutionary stable state of public behaviour under the scenario where enterprises’ marginal environmental governance propensity is low.
Ključne besede: game theory, human behaviour, cooperation, mathematical model, common goods
Objavljeno v DKUM: 28.05.2024; Ogledov: 219; Prenosov: 0

Opis: In this paper, we extend and apply the Matrix Norm (MN) approach to the nonzero-sum bimatrix games. We present preliminary results regarding the convergence of the MN approaches. We provide a notation for expressing nonzero-sum bimatrix games in terms of two matrix games using the idea of separation of a bimatrix game into two different matrix games. Next, we prove theorems regarding boundaries of the game value depending on only norms of the payoff matrix for each player of the nonzero-sum bimatrix game. In addition to these, we refine the boundaries of the game value for the zero/nonzero sum matrix games. Therefore, we succeed to find an improved interval for the game value, which is a crucial improvement for both nonzero and zero-sum matrix games. As a consequence, we can solve a nonzero-sum bimatrix game for each player approximately without solving any equations. Moreover, we modify the inequalities for the extrema of the strategy set for the nonzero-sum bimatrix games. Furthermore, we adapt the min-max theorem of the MN approach for the nonzero-sum bimatrix games. Finally, we consider various bimatrix game examples from the literature, including the famous battle of sexes, to demonstrate the consistency of our approaches. We also show that the repeated applications of Extended Matrix Norm (EMN) methods work well to obtain a better-estimated game value in view of the obtained convergence results.
Ključne besede: game theory, nonzero sum game, bimatrix game, matrix norms, battle of sexes, convergence
Objavljeno v DKUM: 15.04.2024; Ogledov: 317; Prenosov: 244
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