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Different approaches to cross border mobility of patients in the European Union in Czechia, Slovakia and Poland
Filip Křepelka, 2016, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Poland and Slovakia are neighbour countries with similar history and socioeconomic conditions. They share heritage of socialized healthcare. Nevertheless, they adopted different policies towards promotion of patients´ mobility in the European Union. Accession to coordination of social security establishing assistance for tourists was smooth. Providers offer quality care for good prices. Foreign patients come to all three countries. Right for reimbursement of treatment intentionally sought across borders was created by the Court of Justice already before their accession. Nevertheless, they already decided on the Patients´ directive. Czechia supported it, Slovakia abstained and Poland refused. Numerous Poles seek treatment abroad and ask for its reimbursement, while implementing legislation barely complies and authorities are tight-fisted. Few Slovaks do it in accordance with rules adopted with cautiousness. Czechs ignore this opportunity despite official benevolence. Quality of healthcare, various price-setting and peculiarities of public financing explain this difference.
Ključne besede: European Union, free movement of services and goods, medical tourism, public financing of healthcare, patients' rights
Objavljeno: 09.10.2018; Ogledov: 366; Prenosov: 44
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1002,30 KB)
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Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks
Federico Battiston, Matjaž Perc, Vito Latora, 2017, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, networks, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 04.12.2017; Ogledov: 441; Prenosov: 283
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,05 MB)
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Correlation of positive and negative reciprocity fails to confer an evolutionary advantage: phase transitions to elementary strategies
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Economic experiments reveal that humans value cooperation and fairness. Punishing unfair behavioris therefore common, and according to the theory of strong reciprocity, it is also directly related to rewarding cooperative behavior. However, empirical data fail to confirm that positive and negative reciprocity are correlated. Inspired by this disagreement, we determine whether the combined application of reward and punishment is evolutionarily advantageous. We study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to the three elementary strategies of defection, rewarding, and punishment, a fourth strategy that combines the latter two competes for space. We find rich dynamical behavior that gives rise to intricate phase diagrams where continuous and discontinuous phase transitions occur in succession. Indirect territorial competition, spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance, as well as divergent fluctuations of oscillations that terminate in an absorbing phase are observed. Yet, despite the high complexity of solutions, the combined strategy can survive only in very narrow and unrealistic parameter regions. Elementary strategies, either in pure or mixed phases, are much more common and likely to prevail. Our results highlight the importance of patterns and structure in human cooperation, which should be considered in future experiments.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, reward, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.08.2017; Ogledov: 448; Prenosov: 246
.pdf Celotno besedilo (667,46 KB)
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Self-organization of punishment in structured populations
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 539; Prenosov: 306
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,22 MB)
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Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods game
Dirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 705; Prenosov: 284
.pdf Celotno besedilo (823,76 KB)
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Probabilistic sharing solves the problem of costly punishment
Xiaojie Chen, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create the secondorder free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers - those that cooperate and punish - are at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are reminiscent of Parrondoʼs paradox.
Ključne besede: social dynamics, networks, punishment, public goods, econophysics
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 508; Prenosov: 300
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,52 MB)
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Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content.
Ključne besede: cooperation, information, social dilemma, public goods, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 493; Prenosov: 272
.pdf Celotno besedilo (756,59 KB)
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Evolutionary advantages of adaptive rewarding
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Our well-being depends on both our personal success and the success of our society. The realization of this fact makes cooperation an essential trait. Experiments have shown that rewards can elevate our readiness to cooperate, but since giving a reward inevitably entails paying a cost for it, the emergence and stability of such behavior remains elusive. Here we show that allowing for the act of rewarding to self-organize in dependence on the success of cooperation creates several evolutionary advantages that instill new ways through which collaborative efforts are promoted. Ranging from indirect territorial battle to the spontaneous emergence and destruction of coexistence, phase diagrams and the underlying spatial patterns reveal fascinatingly rich social dynamics that explain why this costly behavior has evolved and persevered. Comparisons with adaptive punishment, however, uncover an Achilles heel of adaptive rewarding, coming from over-aggression, which in turn hinders optimal utilization of network reciprocity. This may explain why, despite its success, rewarding is not as firmly embedded into our societal organization as punishment.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, reward, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 819; Prenosov: 301
.pdf Celotno besedilo (2,15 MB)
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Does strong heterogeneity promote cooperation by group interactions?
Matjaž Perc, 2011, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Previous research has highlighted the importance of strong heterogeneity for the successful evolution of cooperation in games governed by pairwise interactions. Here we determine to what extent this is true for games governed by group interactions. We therefore study the evolution of cooperation in the public goods game on the square lattice, the triangular lattice, and the random regular graph, whereby the payoffs are distributed either uniformly or exponentially amongst the players by assigning to them individual scaling factors that determine the share of the public good they will receive. We find that uniformly distributed public goods are more successful in maintaining high levels of cooperation than exponentially distributed public goods. This is not in agreement with previous results on games governed by pairwise interactions, indicating that group interactions may be less susceptible to the promotion of cooperation by means of strong heterogeneity than originally assumed, and that the role of strongly heterogeneous states should be reexamined for other types of games.
Ključne besede: social dilemmas, cooperation, public goods, inequality, social diversity
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 599; Prenosov: 314
.pdf Celotno besedilo (862,29 KB)
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Costly hide and seek pays
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Deliberate deceptiveness intended to gain an advantage is commonplace in human and animal societies. In a social dilemma, an individual may only pretend to be a cooperator to elicit cooperation from others, while in reality he is a defector. With this as motivation, we study a simple variant of the evolutionary prisonerʼs dilemma game entailing deceitful defectors and conditional cooperators that lifts the veil on the impact of such two-faced behavior. Defectors are able to hide their true intentions at a personal cost, while conditional cooperators are probabilistically successful at identifying defectors and act accordingly. By focusing on the evolutionary outcomes in structured populations, we observe a number of unexpected and counterintuitive phenomena. We show that deceitful behavior may fare better if it is costly, and that a higher success rate of identifying defectors does not necessarily favor cooperative behavior. These results are rooted in the spontaneous emergence of cycling dominance and spatial patterns that give rise to fascinating phase transitions, which in turn reveal the hidden complexity behind the evolution of deception.
Ključne besede: social dynamics, deceit, evolutionary games, public goods, econophysics, cooperation
Objavljeno: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 396; Prenosov: 93
.pdf Celotno besedilo (580,42 KB)
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