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1.
Mott-Peierls phase in deuterated copper-DCNQI systems: a comprehensive study of longitudinal and transverse conductivity and ageing effects
Marko Pinterić, Tomislav Vuletić, Martin Lončarić, Konstantin Petukhov, Boris Gorshunov, Jost Ulrich von Schütz, Silvija Tomić, Martin Dressel, 2003, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Transport and low-frequency optical reflection measurements (180-380 GHz) are reported for the quasi-three-dimensional conducting alloy ▫$Cu[(2,5(CH_3)_2-DCNQI)_{0.70}(2,5(CD_3)_2-DCNQI)_{0.30}]_2$▫ between room temperature and 35 K. The optical properties of the system are strongly anisotropic. It is metallic down to 60 K where a Mott-Peierls phase transition occurs. While the transverse conductivity remains practically unchanged, the longitudinal conductivity abruptly drops at the phase transition. Comparing our latest results with previous dc data and measurements of the microwave conductivity also reported here, we find indications of an ageing effect in these samples.
Ključne besede: optical reflection measurements, organic conductors, microwave conductivity, phase transitions metal-insulator, ageing effect
Objavljeno: 01.06.2012; Ogledov: 692; Prenosov: 34
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Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, directional learning, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 207; Prenosov: 148
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,40 MB)
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4.
Vortices determine the dynamics of biodiversity in cyclical interactions with protection spillovers
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: If rock beats scissors and scissors beat paper, one might assume that rock beats paper too. But this is not the case for intransitive relationships that make up the famous rock-paper-scissors game. However, the sole presence of paper might prevent rock from beating scissors, simply because paper beats rock. This is the blueprint for the rock-paper-scissors game with protection spillovers, which has recently been introduced as a new paradigm for biodiversity in well-mixed microbial populations. Here we study the game in structured populations, demonstrating that protection spillovers give rise to spatial patterns that are impossible to observe in the classical rock-paper-scissors game.Weshow that the spatiotemporal dynamics of the system is determined by the density of stable vortices, which may ultimately transform to frozen states, to propagating waves, or to target waves with reversed propagation direction, depending further on the degree and type of randomness in the interactions among the species. If vortices are rare, the fixation to waves and complex oscillatory solutions is likelier. Moreover, annealed randomness in interactions favors the emergence of target waves, while quenched randomness favors collective synchronization. Our results demonstrate that protection spillovers may fundamentally change the dynamics of cyclic dominance in structured populations, and they outline the possibility of programming pattern formation in microbial populations.
Ključne besede: cyclical interactions, pattern formation, vortices, phase transitions, selforganization, biodiversity
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 248; Prenosov: 187
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,32 MB)
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5.
Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Franz Weissing, Matjaž Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 421; Prenosov: 180
.pdf Celotno besedilo (481,90 KB)
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6.
Understanding recurrent crime as system-immanent collective behavior
Matjaž Perc, Karsten Donnay, Dirk Helbing, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Containing the spreading of crime is a major challenge for society. Yet, since thousands of years, no effective strategy has been found to overcome crime. To the contrary, empirical evidence shows that crime is recurrent, a fact that is not captured well by rational choice theories of crime. According to these, strong enough punishment should prevent crime from happening. To gain a better understanding of the relationship between crime and punishment, we consider that the latter requires prior discovery of illicit behavior and study a spatial version of the inspection game. Simulations reveal the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance between criminals, inspectors, and ordinary people as a consequence of spatial interactions. Such cycles dominate the evolutionary process, in particular when the temptation to commit crime or the cost of inspection are low or moderate. Yet, there are also critical parameter values beyond which cycles cease to exist and the population is dominated either by a stable mixture of criminals and inspectors or one of these two strategies alone. Both continuous and discontinuous phase transitions to different final states are possible, indicating that successful strategies to contain crime can be very much counter-intuitive and complex. Our results demonstrate that spatial interactions are crucial for the evolutionary outcome of the inspection game, and they also reveal why criminal behavior is likely to be recurrent rather than evolving towards an equilibrium with monotonous parameter dependencies.
Ključne besede: crime, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, statistical physics
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 421; Prenosov: 175
.pdf Celotno besedilo (433,51 KB)
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7.
Beyond pairwise strategy updating in the prisoner's dilemma game
Xiaofeng Wang, Matjaž Perc, Yongkui Liu, Xiaojie Chen, Long Wang, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In spatial games players typically alter their strategy by imitating the most successful or one randomly selected neighbor. Since a single neighbor is taken as reference, the information stemming from other neighbors is neglected, which begets the consideration of alternative, possibly more realistic approaches. Here we show that strategy changes inspired not only by the performance of individual neighbors but rather by entire neighborhoods introduce a qualitatively different evolutionary dynamics that is able to support the stable existence of very small cooperative clusters. This leads to phase diagrams that differ significantly from those obtained by means of pairwise strategy updating. In particular, the survivability of cooperators is possible even by high temptations to defect and over a much wider uncertainty range. We support the simulation results by means of pair approximations and analysis of spatial patterns, which jointly highlight the importance of local information for the resolution of social dilemmas.
Ključne besede: cooperation, social dilemma, wisdom of crowds, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 202; Prenosov: 162
.pdf Celotno besedilo (825,96 KB)
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8.
Defection and extortion as unexpected catalysts of unconditional cooperation in structured populations
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner%s dilemma game, where besides unconditional cooperation and defection, tit-for-tat, win-stay-lose-shift and extortion are the five competing strategies. While pairwise imitation fails to sustain unconditional cooperation and extortion regardless of game parametrization, myopic updating gives rise to the coexistence of all five strategies if the temptation to defect is sufficiently large or if the degree distribution of the interaction network is heterogeneous. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome emerges as a result of an unexpected chain of strategy invasions. Firstly, defectors emerge and coarsen spontaneously among players adopting win-stay-lose-shift. Secondly, extortioners and players adopting tit-for-tat emerge and spread via neutral drift among the emerged defectors. And lastly, among the extortioners, cooperators become viable too. These recurrent evolutionary invasions yield a five-strategy phase that is stable irrespective of the system size and the structure of the interaction network, and they reveal the most unexpected mechanism that stabilizes extortion and cooperation in an evolutionary setting.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 217; Prenosov: 164
.pdf Celotno besedilo (995,18 KB)
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9.
Excessive abundance of common resources deters social responsibility
Xiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the collective-risk social dilemma game, where the risk is determined by a collective target that must be reached with individual contributions. All players initially receive endowments from the available amount of common resources. While cooperators contribute part of their endowment to the collective target, defectors do not. If the target is not reached, the endowments of all players are lost. In our model, we introduce a feedback between the amount of common resources and the contributions of cooperators. We show that cooperation can be sustained only if the common resources are preserved but never excessively abound. This, however, requires a delicate balance between the amount of common resources that initially exist, and the amount cooperators contribute to the collective target. Exceeding critical thresholds in either of the two amounts leads to loss of cooperation, and consequently to the depletion of common resources.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, evolutionary games, public goods, abundance, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 381; Prenosov: 172
.pdf Celotno besedilo (950,12 KB)
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10.
If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 298; Prenosov: 157
.pdf Celotno besedilo (413,53 KB)
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