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Adaptive and bounded investment returns promote cooperation in spatial public goods games
Xiaojie Chen, Yongkui Liu, Yonghui Zhou, Long Wang, Matjaž Perc, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: The public goods game is one of the most famous models for studying the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups. The multiplication factor in this game can characterize the investment return from the public good, which may be variable depending on the interactive environment in realistic situations. Instead of using the same universal value, here we consider that the multiplication factor in each group is updated based on the differences between the local and global interactive environments in the spatial public goods game, but meanwhile limited to within a certain range. We find that the adaptive and bounded investment returns can significantly promote cooperation. In particular, full cooperation can be achieved for high feedback strength when appropriate limitation is set for the investment return. Also, we show that the fraction of cooperators in the whole population can become larger if the lower and upper limits of the multiplication factor are increased. Furthermore, in comparison to the traditionally spatial public goods game where the multiplication factor in each group is identical and fixed, we find that cooperation can be better promoted if the multiplication factor is constrained to adjust between one and the group size in our model. Our results highlight the importance of the locally adaptive and bounded investment returns for the emergence and dominance of cooperative behavior in structured populations.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, social dilemmas, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 255; Prenosov: 165
.pdf Celotno besedilo (590,51 KB)
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5.
If cooperation is likely punish mildly: insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game
Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.
Ključne besede: public goods, punishment, economic experiments, snowdrift game
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 291; Prenosov: 174
.pdf Celotno besedilo (522,94 KB)
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6.
Directional learning and the provisioning of public goods
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We consider an environment where players are involved in a public goods game and must decide repeatedly whether to make an individual contribution or not. However, players lack strategically relevant information about the game and about the other players in the population. The resulting behavior of players is completely uncoupled from such information, and the individual strategy adjustment dynamics are driven only by reinforcement feedbacks from each player's own past. We show that the resulting "directional learning" is sufficient to explain cooperative deviations away from the Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of k-strong equilibria, which nest both the Nash equilibrium and the Aumann-strong equilibrium as two special cases, and we show that, together with the parameters of the learning model, the maximal k-strength of equilibrium determines the stationary distribution. The provisioning of public goods can be secured even under adverse conditions, as long as players are sufficiently responsive to the changes in their own payoffs and adjust their actions accordingly. Substantial levels of public cooperation can thus be explained without arguments involving selflessness or social preferences, solely on the basis of uncoordinated directional (mis)learning.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, directional learning, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 197; Prenosov: 140
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,40 MB)
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7.
An evolutionary inspection game with labour unions on small-world networks
Salahuddin M. Kamal, Yas Al-Hadeethi, Fouad A. Abolaban, Fahad M. Al-Marzouki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: We study an evolutionary inspection game where agents can chose between working and shirking. The evolutionary process is staged on a small-world network, through which agents compare their incomes and, based on the outcome, decide which strategy to adopt. Moreover, we introduce union members that have certain privileges, of which the extent depends on the bargaining power of the union. We determine how the union affects the overall performance of the firm that employs the agents, and what are its influences on the employees. We find that, depending on its bargaining power, the union has significant leverage to deteriorate the productivity of a firm, and consequently also to lower the long-run benefits of the employees.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, inspection, unions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 249; Prenosov: 135
.pdf Celotno besedilo (568,84 KB)
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8.
Stability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Heinrich H. Nax, Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, Dirk Helbing, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Image scoring sustains cooperation in the repeated two-player prisoner's dilemma through indirect reciprocity, even though defection is the uniquely dominant selfish behaviour in the one-shot game. Many real-world dilemma situations, however, firstly, take place in groups and, secondly, lack the necessary transparency to inform subjects reliably of others' individual past actions. Instead, there is revelation of information regarding groups, which allows for "group scoring" but not for image scoring. Here, we study how sensitive the positive results related to image scoring are to information based on group scoring. We combine analytic results and computer simulations to specify the conditions for the emergence of cooperation. We show that under pure group scoring, that is, under the complete absence of image-scoring information, cooperation is unsustainable. Away from this extreme case, however, the necessary degree of image scoring relative to group scoring depends on the population size and is generally very small. We thus conclude that the positive results based on image scoring apply to a much broader range of informational settings that are relevant in the real world than previously assumed.
Ključne besede: public goods, group interactions, phase transition, social dilemma, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 501; Prenosov: 166
.pdf Celotno besedilo (329,32 KB)
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9.
Evolution of public cooperation in a monitored society with implicated punishment and within-group enforcement
Xiaojie Chen, Tatsuya Sasaki, Matjaž Perc, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Monitoring with implicated punishment is common in human societies to avert freeriding on common goods. But is it effective in promoting public cooperation? We show that the introduction of monitoring and implicated punishment is indeed effective, as it transforms the public goods game to a coordination game, thus rendering cooperation viable in infinite and finite well-mixed populations. We also show that the addition of within-group enforcement further promotes the evolution of public cooperation. However, although the group size in this context has nonlinear effects on collective action, an intermediate group size is least conductive to cooperative behaviour. This contradicts recent field observations, where an intermediate group size was declared optimal with the conjecture that group-size effects and within-group enforcement are responsible. Our theoretical research thus clarifies key aspects of monitoring with implicated punishment in human societies, and additionally, it reveals fundamental group-size effects that facilitate prosocial collective action.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, sustainable development, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 287; Prenosov: 162
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,50 MB)
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10.
Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation
Chunyan Zhang, Jianlei Zhang, Franz Weissing, Matjaž Perc, Guangming Xie, Long Wang, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 412; Prenosov: 172
.pdf Celotno besedilo (481,90 KB)
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