Iskanje po katalogu digitalne knjižnice

Opis: According to the fundamental principle of evolutionary game theory, the more successful strategy in a population should spread. Hence, during a strategy imitation process a player compares its payoff value to the payoff value held by a competing strategy. But this information is not always accurate. To avoid ambiguity a learner may therefore decide to collect a more reliable statistics by averaging the payoff values of its opponents in the neighborhood, and makes a decision afterwards. This simple alteration of the standard microscopic protocol significantly improves the cooperation level in a population. Furthermore, the positive impact can be strengthened by increasing the role of the environment and the size of the evaluation circle. The mechanism that explains this improvement is based on a self-organizing process which reveals the detrimental consequence of defector aggregation that remains partly hidden during face-to-face comparisons. Notably, the reported phenomenon is not limited to lattice populations but remains valid also for systems described by irregular interaction networks.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, cooperation, learning, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.03.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 2
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Opis: In this paper, we explore the impact of four different types of dissimilarity-driven behavior on the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game. While it is commonly assumed that individuals adapt their strategy by imitating one of their more successful neighbors, in reality only very few will be awarded the highest payoffs. Many have equity or equality preferences, and they have to make do with an average or even with a low payoff. To account for this, we divide the population into two categories. One consists of payoff-driven players, while the other consists of dissimilarity-driven players. The later imitate the minority strategy in their group based on four different dissimilaritydriven behaviors. The rule that most effectively promotes cooperation, and this regardless of the multiplication factor of the public goods game, is when individuals adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is better than that of their neighbors. If the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy regardless of the payoffs of others, or if their payoff is the same, the population typically evolves towards a neutral state where cooperators and defectors are equally common. This may be beneficial when the multiplication factor is low, when defectors would otherwise dominate. However, if the dissimilarity-driven players adopt the minority strategy only when their payoff is worse than that of their neighbors, then cooperation is not promoted at all in comparison to the baseline case in the absence of dissimilarity-driven behavior. We explore the pattern formation behind these results, and we discuss their wider implications for the better understanding of cooperative behavior in social groups.
Ključne besede: theoretical biology, evolution, agent-based modeling, complex system, network science, evolutionary game theory
Objavljeno v DKUM: 26.02.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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Opis: Multiplayer games on graphs are at the heart of theoretical descriptions of key evolutionary processes that govern vital social and natural systems. However, a comprehensive theoretical framework for solving multiplayer games with an arbitrary number of strategies on graphs is still missing. Here, we solve this by drawing an analogy with the Balls-and-Boxes problem, based on which we show that the local configuration of multiplayer games on graphs is equivalent to distributing k identical co-players among n distinct strategies. We use this to derive the replicator equation for any n-strategy multiplayer game under weak selection, which can be solved in polynomial time. As an example, we revisit the second-order free-riding problem, where costly punishment cannot truly resolve social dilemmas in a well-mixed population. Yet, in structured populations, we derive an accurate threshold for the punishment strength, beyond which punishment can either lead to the extinction of defection or transform the system into a rock-paper-scissors-like cycle. The analytical solution also qualitatively agrees with the phase diagrams that were previously obtained for non-marginal selection strengths. Our framework thus allows an exploration of any multi-strategy multiplayer game on regular graphs.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, cooperation, network, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 26.02.2025; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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Opis: Understanding human behaviour in decision problems and strategicinteractions has wide-ranging applications in economics, psychology andartificial intelligence. Game theory offers a robust foundation for this under-standing, based on the idea that individuals aim to maximize a utilityfunction. However, the exact factors influencing strategy choices remainelusive. While traditional models try to explain human behaviour as a func-tion of the outcomes of available actions, recent experimental researchreveals that linguistic content significantly impacts decision-making, thusprompting a paradigm shift from outcome-based to language-based utilityfunctions. This shift is more urgent than ever, given the advancement ofgenerative AI, which has the potential to support humans in making criticaldecisions through language-based interactions. We propose sentiment analy-sis as a fundamental tool for this shift and take an initial step by analysing61 experimental instructions from the dictator game, an economic gamecapturing the balance between self-interest and the interest of others,which is at the core of many social interactions. Our meta-analysis showsthat sentiment analysis can explain human behaviour beyond economicoutcomes. We discuss future research directions. We hope this worksets the stage for a novel game-theoretical approach that emphasizes theimportance of language in human decisions.
Ključne besede: game theory, artificial intelligence, social preferences, language-based preferences, social physics, moral behavior, trust
Objavljeno v DKUM: 27.11.2024; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 363
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Opis: The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at diferent scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network, can lead to the spreading of cooperation. In this paper we demonstrate that in many scenarios some cooperators are more infuential than others and their initial positions can facilitate the spreading of cooperation. We investigate six diferent ways to add initial cooperators in a network of cheaters, based on diferent network-based measurements. Our research reveals that strategically positioning the initial cooperators in a population of cheaters allows to decrease the number of initial cooperators necessary to successfully seed cooperation. The strategic positioning of initial cooperators can also help to shorten the time necessary for the restoration of cooperation. The optimal ways in which the initial cooperators should be placed is, however, non-trivial in that it depends on the degree of competition, the underlying game, and the network structure. Overall, our results show that, in structured populations, few cooperators, well positioned in strategically chosen places, can spread cooperation faster and easier than a large number of cooperators that are placed badly.
Ključne besede: cooperation, evolutionary game theory, social physics, collective dynamics, complex system
Objavljeno v DKUM: 22.10.2024; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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