1. Diverse strategic identities induce dynamical states in evolutionary gamesIrene Sendiña-Nadal, Inmaculada Leyva, Matjaž Perc, David Papo, Marko Jusup, Zhen Wang, Juan A. Almendral, Pouya Manshour, Stefano Boccaletti, 2020, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity preservation. An important, and so far overlooked, aspect of reality is the diverse strategic identities of individuals. While applying the same strategy to all interaction partners may be an acceptable assumption for simpler forms of life, this fails to account for the behavior of more complex living beings. For instance, we humans act differently around different people. Here we show that allowing individuals to adopt different strategies with different partners yields a very rich evolutionary dynamics, including time-dependent coexistence of cooperation and defection, systemwide shifts in the dominant strategy, and maturation in individual choices. Our results are robust to variations in network type and size, and strategy updating rules. Accounting for diverse strategic identities thus has far-reaching implications in the mathematical modeling of social games.
Ključne besede: cooperation, evolutionary game theory, social physics, collective dynamics, complex system
Objavljeno v DKUM: 20.11.2024; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 3
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2. Strategically positioning cooperators can facilitate the contagion of cooperationGuoli Yang, Matteo Cavaliere, Cheng Zhu, Matjaž Perc, 2021, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: The spreading of cooperation in structured population is a challenging problem which can be observed at diferent scales of social and biological organization. Generally, the problem is studied by evaluating the chances that few initial invading cooperators, randomly appearing in a network, can lead to the spreading of cooperation. In this paper we demonstrate that in many scenarios some cooperators are more infuential than others and their initial positions can facilitate the spreading of cooperation. We investigate six diferent ways to add initial cooperators in a network of cheaters, based on diferent network-based measurements. Our research reveals that strategically positioning the initial cooperators in a population of cheaters allows to decrease the number of initial cooperators necessary to successfully seed cooperation. The strategic positioning of initial cooperators can also help to shorten the time necessary for the restoration of cooperation. The optimal ways in which the initial cooperators should be placed is, however, non-trivial in that it depends on the degree of competition, the underlying game, and the network structure. Overall, our results show that, in structured populations, few cooperators, well positioned in strategically chosen places, can spread cooperation faster and easier than a large number of cooperators that are placed badly.
Ključne besede: cooperation, evolutionary game theory, social physics, collective dynamics, complex system
Objavljeno v DKUM: 22.10.2024; Ogledov: 0; Prenosov: 1
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3. Rewarding policies in an asymmetric game for sustainable tourismManuel Chica, Juan M. Hernández, Matjaž Perc, 2023, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Tourism is a growing sector worldwide, but many popular destinations are facing sustainability problems due to excessive tourist flows and inappropriate behavior. In these areas, there is an urgent need to apply mechanisms to stimulate sustainable practices. This paper studies the most efficient strategy to incentivize sustainable tourism by using an asymmetric evolutionary game. We analyze the application of rewarding policies to the asymmetric game where tourists and stakeholders interact in a spatial lattice, and where tourists can also migrate. The incentives of the rewarding policies have an economic budget which can be allocated to tourists, to stakeholders, or to both sub-populations. The results show that an adaptive rewarding strategy, where the incentive budget changes over time to one or the other sub-population, is more effective than simple rewarding strategies that are exclusively focused on one sub-population. However, when the population density in the game decreases, rewarding just tourists becomes the most effective strategy.
Ključne besede: rewarding, asymmetric game, migration, evolutionary game theory, sustainability, tourism
Objavljeno v DKUM: 24.07.2024; Ogledov: 111; Prenosov: 4
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4. Reputation and reciprocity : reviewChengyi Xia, Juan Wang, Matjaž Perc, Zhen Wang, 2023, pregledni znanstveni članek Opis: Reputation and reciprocity are key mechanisms for cooperation in human societies, often going hand in hand to favor prosocial behavior over selfish actions. Here we review recent researches at the interface of physics and evolutionary game theory that explored these two mechanisms. We focus on image scoring as the bearer of reputation, as well as on various types of reciprocity, including direct, indirect, and network reciprocity. We review different definitions of reputation and reciprocity dynamics, and we show how these affect the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. We consider first-order, second-order, as well as higherorder models in well-mixed and structured populations, and we review experimental works that support and inform the results of mathematical modeling and simulations. We also provide a synthesis of the reviewed researches along with an outlook in terms of six directions that seem particularly promising to explore in the future.
Ključne besede: pattern formation, Monte Carlo method, complex network, evolutionary game theory, cooperation, social physics
Objavljeno v DKUM: 20.06.2024; Ogledov: 154; Prenosov: 14
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5. Sustainability in tourism determined by an asymmetric game with mobilityManuel Chica, Juan M. Hernández, Matjaž Perc, 2022, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Many countries worldwide rely on tourism for their economic well-being and development. But with issues such as over-tourism and environmental degradation looming large, there is a pressing need to determine a way forward in a sustainable and mutually rewarding manner. With this motivation, we here propose an asymmetric evolutionary game with mobility where local stakeholders and tourists can either cooperate or defect in a spatially structured setting. Our study reflects that sustainable tourism is primarily determined by an optimal trade-off between economic benefits of the stakeholders and their costs related to the application of sustainability policies. In contrast, the specific benefits and costs of the tourists are comparatively less relevant. The reader can also observe that allowing for greater tourist mobility decreases cooperation and leads to faster polarization among local stakeholders. In agreement with observations worldwide, we identify decreasing population densities in tourist areas in terms of both, stakeholders and tourists, to be a key aid to greater cooperation and overall sustainability of tourism. These results are rooted in spatial formations and complex alliances that manifest spontaneously through the evolutionary dynamics in a structured population.
Ključne besede: asymmetric game, spatial structure, migration, evolutionary game theory, sustainable tourism, over-tourism
Objavljeno v DKUM: 24.08.2023; Ogledov: 590; Prenosov: 36
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6. Punish, but not too hard: how costly punishment spreads in the spatial public goods gameDirk Helbing, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, György Szabó, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games where, besides the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), we consider punishing cooperators (PC) or punishing defectors (PD) as an additional strategy. Using a minimalist modeling approach, our goal is to separately clarify and identify the consequences of the two punishing strategies. Since punishment is costly, punishing strategies lose the evolutionary competition in case of well-mixed interactions. When spatial interactions are taken into account, however, the outcome can be strikingly different, and cooperation may spread. The underlying mechanism depends on the character of the punishment strategy. In the case of cooperating punishers,increasing the fine results in a rising cooperation level. In contrast, in the presence of the PD strategy, the phase diagram exhibits a reentrant transition as the fine is increased. Accordingly, the level of cooperation shows a non-monotonous dependence on the fine. Remarkably, punishing strategies can spread in both cases, but based on largely different mechanisms, which depend on the cooperativeness (or not) of punishers.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, public goods, spatial games, punishment, social systems, moral
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1855; Prenosov: 400
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7. Evolution of cooperation on scale-free networks subject to error and attackMatjaž Perc, 2009, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game on scale-free networks that are subjected to intentional and random removal of vertices. We show that, irrespective of the game type, cooperation on scale-free networks is extremely robust against random deletionof vertices, but declines quickly if vertices with the maximal degree are targeted. In particular, attack tolerance is lowest if the temptation to defect is largest, whereby a small fraction of removed vertices suffices to decimate cooperators. The decline of cooperation can be directly linked to the decrease of heterogeneity of scale-free networks that sets in due to the removal of high degree vertices. We conclude that the evolution of cooperation is characterized by similar attack and error tolerance as was previously reported for information readiness and spread of viruses on scale-free networks.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, social dilemma, spatial games, complex networks
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1622; Prenosov: 377
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8. Emergence of multilevel selection in the prisoner's dilemma game on coevolving random networksAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2009, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1738; Prenosov: 418
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9. Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods gameAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2016, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where in addition to cooperators, defectors, and loners, tolerant players are also present. Depending on the number of defectors within a group, a tolerant player can either cooperate in or abstain from a particular instance of the game.Weshow that the diversity of tolerance can give rise to synergistic effects, wherein players with a different threshold in terms of the tolerated number of defectors in a group compete most effectively against defection and default abstinence. Such synergistic associations can stabilise states of full cooperation where otherwise defection would dominate.Weobserve complex pattern formation that gives rise to an intricate phase diagram, where invisible yet stable strategy alliances require outmost care lest they are overlooked. Our results highlight the delicate importance of diversity and tolerance for the provisioning of public goods, and they reveal fascinating subtleties of the spatiotemporal dynamics that is due to the competition of subsystem solutions in structured populations.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, public goods game, human cooperation
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1332; Prenosov: 408
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10. Coevolution of teaching activity promotes cooperationAttila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2008, izvirni znanstveni članek Opis: Evolutionary games are studied where the teaching activity of players can evolve in time. Initially all players following either the cooperative or defecting strategy are distributed on a square lattice. The rate of strategy adoption is determined by the payoff difference and a teaching activity characterizing the donor's capability to enforce its strategy on the opponent. Each successful strategy adoption process is accompanied by an increase in the donor's teaching activity. By applying an optimum value of the increment, this simple mechanism spontaneously creates relevant inhomogeneities in the teaching activities that support the maintenance of cooperation for both the prisoner's dilemma and the snowdrift game.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, snowdrift game, coevolution
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1370; Prenosov: 480
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