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41.
Information sharing promotes prosocial behaviour
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here we show that sharing information about strategy choice between players residing on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary games, the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we observe the spontaneous emergence of correlated behaviour between the two networks, which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regard to content.
Ključne besede: cooperation, information, social dilemma, public goods, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 299; Prenosov: 162
.pdf Celotno besedilo (756,59 KB)
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42.
Self-organization of punishment in structured populations
Matjaž Perc, Attila Szolnoki, 2012, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Cooperation is crucial for the remarkable evolutionary success of the human species. Not surprisingly, some individuals are willing to bear additional costs in order to punish defectors. Current models assume that, once set, the fine and cost of punishment do not change over time. Here we show that relaxing this assumption by allowing players to adapt their sanctioning efforts in dependence on the success of cooperation can explain both the spontaneous emergence of punishment and its ability to deter defectors and those unwilling to punish them with globally negligible investments. By means of phase diagrams and the analysis of emerging spatial patterns, we demonstrate that adaptive punishment promotes public cooperation through the invigoration of spatial reciprocity, the prevention of the emergence of cyclic dominance, or the provision of competitive advantages to those that sanction antisocial behavior. The results presented indicate that the process of self-organization significantly elevates the effectiveness of punishment, and they reveal new mechanisms by means of which this fascinating and widespread social behavior could have evolved.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, punishment, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 302; Prenosov: 178
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,22 MB)
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43.
Self-organization towards optimally interdependent networks by means of coevolution
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.
Ključne besede: coevolution, cooperation, interdependent networks, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, self-organization, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 312; Prenosov: 156
.pdf Celotno besedilo (887,51 KB)
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44.
Optimal distribution of incentives for public cooperation in heterogeneous interaction environments
Xiaojie Chen, Matjaž Perc, 2014, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In the framework of evolutionary games with institutional reciprocity, limited incentives are at disposal for rewarding cooperators and punishing defectors. In the simplest case, it can be assumed that, depending on their strategies, all players receive equal incentives from the common pool. The question arises, however, what is the optimal distribution of institutional incentives? How should we best reward and punish individuals for cooperation to thrive? We study this problem for the public goods game on a scale-free network. We show that if the synergetic effects of group interactions are weak, the level of cooperation in the population can be maximized simply by adopting the simplest "equal distribution" scheme. If synergetic effects are strong, however, it is best to reward high-degree nodes more than low-degree nodes. These distribution schemes for institutional rewards are independent of payoff normalization. For institutional punishment, however, the same optimization problem is more complex, and its solution depends on whether absolute or degree-normalized payoffs are used. We find that degree-normalized payoffs require high-degree nodes be punished more lenient than low-degree nodes. Conversely, if absolute payoffs count, then high-degree nodes should be punished stronger than low-degree nodes.
Ključne besede: public cooperation, institutional reciprocity, scale-free network, punishment, reward
Objavljeno: 10.07.2017; Ogledov: 375; Prenosov: 207
.pdf Celotno besedilo (3,26 MB)
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45.
Toward the discovery of citation cartels in citation networks
Iztok Fister, Iztok Fister, Matjaž Perc, 2016, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: In this perspective, our goal is to present and elucidate a thus far largely overlooked problem that is arising in scientific publishing, namely the identification and discovery of citation cartels in citation networks. Taking from the well-known definition of a community in the realm of network science, namely that people within a community share significantly more links with each other as they do outside of this community, we propose that citation cartels are defined as groups of authors that cite each other disproportionately more than they do other groups of authors that work on the same subject. Evidently, the identification of citation cartels is somewhat different, although similar to the identification of communities in networks. We systematically expose the problem, provide theoretical examples, and outline an algorithmic guide on how to approach the subject.
Ključne besede: citation network, citation cartel, network science, community detection, cooperation
Objavljeno: 10.07.2017; Ogledov: 559; Prenosov: 163
.pdf Celotno besedilo (855,89 KB)
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46.
Inter-municipal cooperation
Iztok Rakar, Bojan Tičar, Maja Klun, 2015, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: The financial crisis has once again brought up the question of the "perfect size" of local governments and revealed a new dimension of the eternal question of financing self-governing local communities. The paper presents a comparative overview of efforts to determine the "perfect size" of municipalities and recent reforms in different countries aimed at enabling municipalities to ensure both local-level democracy and identity, and economic efficiency in the delivery of public services. One of the most popular ways for achieving this goal is to promote various forms of inter-municipal cooperation. Some forms of inter-municipal cooperation already exist in Slovenia; a considerable breakthrough in this regard occurred in 2007, but such an approach would have been possible much earlier. Analyses show that this change is due to changes in the rules regarding co-financing. Despite the fact that neither literature nor politics in Slovenia sees inter-municipal cooperation as an alternative to merging municipalities, experiences show that practice will proceed in this direction.
Ključne besede: municipalities, inter-municipalk cooperation, Slovenia, European Union
Objavljeno: 14.07.2017; Ogledov: 581; Prenosov: 41
.pdf Celotno besedilo (571,95 KB)
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47.
Second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2017, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Economic experiments have shown that punishment can increase public goods game contributions over time. However, the effectiveness of punishment is challenged by second-order free-riding and antisocial punishment. The latter implies that noncooperators punish cooperators, while the former implies unwillingness to shoulder the cost of punishment. Here, we extend the theory of cooperation in the spatial public goods game by considering four competing strategies, which are traditional cooperators and defectors, as well as cooperators who punish defectors and defectors who punish cooperators. We show that if the synergistic effects are high enough to sustain cooperation based on network reciprocity alone, antisocial punishment does not deter public cooperation. Conversely, if synergistic effects are low and punishment is actively needed to sustain cooperation, antisocial punishment does is viable, but only if the cost-to-fine ratio is low. If the costs are relatively high, cooperation again dominates as a result of spatial pattern formation. Counterintuitively, defectors who do not punish cooperators, and are thus effectively second-order free-riding on antisocial punishment, form an active layer around punishing cooperators, which protects them against defectors that punish cooperators. A stable three-strategy phase that is sustained by the spontaneous emergence of cyclic dominance is also possible via the same route. The microscopic mechanism behind the reported evolutionary outcomes can be explained by the comparison of invasion rates that determine the stability of subsystem solutions. Our results reveal an unlikely evolutionary escape from adverse effects of antisocial punishment, and they provide a rationale for why second-order free-riding is not always an impediment to the evolutionary stability of punishment.
Ključne besede: complex systems, interdisciplinary physics, punishment, cooperation
Objavljeno: 13.11.2017; Ogledov: 255; Prenosov: 174
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,15 MB)
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48.
Intergenerational cooperation at the workplace from the management perspective
Živa Veingerl Čič, Simona Šarotar Žižek, 2017, pregledni znanstveni članek

Opis: The labor market is currently experiencing employees of four generations. Each generation has different behavior patterns, attitudes, expectations, habits, and motivational mechanisms. As generational gaps play an important role in the business process, organizations have to find ways to balance the needs and views of different age groups. To overcome the negative outcomes arising from generational differences and to use the strengths of each generation, the implementation of comprehensive and proactive model of intergenerational cooperation, presented in the paper, is becoming the necessity for each organization because of the benefits.
Ključne besede: employees, generation, intergenerational cooperation, intergenerational learning
Objavljeno: 13.11.2017; Ogledov: 510; Prenosov: 191
.pdf Celotno besedilo (413,71 KB)
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49.
Determinants of public cooperation in multiplex networks
Federico Battiston, Matjaž Perc, Vito Latora, 2017, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Synergies between evolutionary game theory and statistical physics have significantly improved our understanding of public cooperation in structured populations. Multiplex networks, in particular, provide the theoretical framework within network science that allows us to mathematically describe the rich structure of interactions characterizing human societies. While research has shown that multiplex networks may enhance the resilience of cooperation, the interplay between the overlap in the structure of the layers and the control parameters of the corresponding games has not yet been investigated. With this aim, we consider here the public goods game on a multiplex network, and we unveil the role of the number of layers and the overlap of links, as well as the impact of different synergy factors in different layers, on the onset of cooperation. We show that enhanced public cooperation emerges only when a significant edge overlap is combined with at least one layer being able to sustain some cooperation by means of a sufficiently high synergy factor. In the absence of either of these conditions, the evolution of cooperation in multiplex networks is determined by the bounds of traditional network reciprocity with no enhanced resilience. These results caution against overly optimistic predictions that the presence of multiple social domains may in itself promote cooperation, and they help us better understand the complexity behind prosocial behavior in layered social systems.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, networks, physics of social systems
Objavljeno: 04.12.2017; Ogledov: 247; Prenosov: 168
.pdf Celotno besedilo (1,05 MB)
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50.
Teaching Scrum in cooperation with a software development company
Viljan Mahnič, Strahil Georgiev, Tomo Jarc, 2010, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: The increasing use of agile methods for software development creates the need for these methods to become part of the education of future computer and information science engineers. On the other hand, teaching these methods gives us an opportunity to verify individual agile concepts and their effectiveness. For that reason, project work is an appropriate and frequently used form of teaching that enables students to get acquainted with agile methods and, at the same time, provides case studies for evaluating individual agile concepts. We describe our approach to teaching the Scrum agile method, within the software technology course, in cooperation with a software development company. Students were taught through work on a real project for which a list of requirements was submitted by the company. A co-worker of this company participated throughout the teaching period playing the role of customer's representative. During their work, students consistently used the Scrum method and at the end of each iteration they evaluated their experience by means of a questionnaire. In the article, the Scrum method is presented first, then a description of work on the project is given and finally the results of the survey are described.
Ključne besede: agile methods, Scrum, software development, computer engineering education, university industry cooperation
Objavljeno: 22.01.2018; Ogledov: 139; Prenosov: 121
.pdf Celotno besedilo (974,55 KB)
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