Iskanje po katalogu digitalne knjižnice

Opis: Coevolution between strategy and network structure is established as a means to arrive at the optimal conditions needed to resolve social dilemmas. Yet recent research has highlighted that the interdependence between networks may be just as important as the structure of an individual network. We therefore introduce the coevolution of strategy and network interdependence to see whether this can give rise to elevated levels of cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma game. We show that the interdependence between networks self-organizes so as to yield optimal conditions for the evolution of cooperation. Even under extremely adverse conditions, cooperators can prevail where on isolated networks they would perish. This is due to the spontaneous emergence of a two-class society, with only the upper class being allowed to control and take advantage of the interdependence. Spatial patterns reveal that cooperators, once arriving at the upper class, are much more competent than defectors in sustaining compact clusters of followers. Indeed, the asymmetric exploitation of interdependence confers to them a strong evolutionary advantage that may resolve even the toughest of social dilemmas.
Ključne besede: coevolution, cooperation, interdependent networks, evolutionary games, collective phenomena, self-organization, phase transitions, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 03.07.2017; Ogledov: 1329; Prenosov: 422
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Opis: We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player adopts a new strategy or its degree exceeds a threshold value; second, new links are added randomly after a given number of game iterations. These coevolutionary processes correspond to the generic formation of new links and deletion of existing links that, especially in human societies, appear frequently as a consequence of ongoing socialization, change of lifestyle or death. Due to the counteraction of deletions and additions of links the initial heterogeneity of the interaction network is qualitatively preserved, and thus cannot be held responsible for the observed promotion of cooperation. Indeed, the coevolutionary rule evokes the spontaneous emergence of a powerful multilevel selection mechanism, which despite the sustained random topology of the evolving network, maintains cooperation across the whole span of defection temptation values.
Ključne besede: evolutionary game theory, prisoner's dilemma, spatial games, coevolution, social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 30.06.2017; Ogledov: 1738; Prenosov: 418
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Opis: We study the impact of adaptive degrees of trust on the evolution of cooperation in the quantum prisoner's dilemma game. In addition to the strategies, links between players are also subject to evolution. Starting with a scale-free interaction network, players adjust trust towards their neighbors based on received payoffs. The latter governs the strategy adoption process, while trust governs the rewiring of links. As soon as the degree of trust towards a neighbor drops to zero, the link is rewired to another randomly chosen player within the network. We find that for small temptations to defect cooperators always dominate, while for intermediate and strong temptations a single quantum strategy is able to outperform all other strategies. In general, reciprocal trust remains within close relationships and favors the dominance of a single strategy. Due to coevolution, the power-law degree distributions transform to Poisson distributions.
Ključne besede: evolutionary games, quantum strategies, coevolution, random networks, cooperation, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1021; Prenosov: 366
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Opis: In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.
Ključne besede: cooperation, public goods, phase transitions, social dilemmas, coevolution, physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 19.06.2017; Ogledov: 1432; Prenosov: 392
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