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1.
Spreading of cooperative behaviour across interdependent groups
Luo-Luo Jiang, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Recent empirical research has shown that links between groups reinforce individuals within groups to adopt cooperative behaviour. Moreover, links between networks may induce cascading failures, competitive percolation, or contribute to efficient transportation. Here we show that there in fact exists an intermediate fraction of links between groups that is optimal for the evolution of cooperation in the prisoners dilemma game. We consider individual groups with regular, random, and scale-free topology, and study their different combinations to reveal that an intermediate interdependence optimally facilitates the spreading of cooperative behaviour between groups. Excessive between-group links simply unify the two groups and make them act as one, while too rare between-group links preclude a useful information flow between the two groups. Interestingly, we find that between-group links are more likely to connect two cooperators than in-group links, thus supporting the conclusion that they are of paramount importance.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1587; Prenosov: 408
.pdf Celotno besedilo (665,03 KB)
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2.
Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1089; Prenosov: 373
.pdf Celotno besedilo (658,72 KB)
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3.
Interdependent network reciprocity in evolutionary games
Zhen Wang, Attila Szolnoki, Matjaž Perc, 2013, izvirni znanstveni članek

Opis: Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means of a utility function, which determines how payoffs on both networks jointly influence the success of players in each individual network. We show that an unbiased coupling allows the spontaneous emergence of interdependent network reciprocity, which is capable to maintain healthy levels of public cooperation even in extremely adverse conditions. The mechanism, however, requires simultaneous formation of correlated cooperator clusters on both networks. If this does not emerge or if the coordination process is disturbed, network reciprocity fails, resulting in the total collapse of cooperation. Network interdependence can thus be exploited effectively to promote cooperation past the limits imposed by isolated networks, but only if the coordination between the interdependent networks is not disturbed.
Ključne besede: social dilemma, cooperation, public goods, biased utility, interdependent networks, statistical physics of social systems
Objavljeno v DKUM: 23.06.2017; Ogledov: 1108; Prenosov: 379
.pdf Celotno besedilo (741,04 KB)
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